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ABSTRACT 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS AT ALL UTILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
FACTORS THAT LEAD ELECTRIC UTILITIES TO INVEST IN ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY 
 FEBRUARY 2013  
CHRISTOPHER PLETCHER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Henry Renski 
 While the utilization of energy efficiency has grown in 
recent years, it has not been distributed evenly across the 
country. In some states, over 2% of a utility’s budget is spent 
on energy efficiency; in other states that number is 0.  Much of 
the growth in energy efficiency has been due to state policies 
and the development utility-level energy efficiency programs.  
Yet, all utility programs are not created equal. Because they are 
often exempt from state regulation (and therefore state energy 
efficiency policy), publicly-owned utilities have traditionally 
lagged behind IOUs when it comes to EE programs.   
 This research quantifies energy efficiency programs in four 
Midwestern states: Iowa, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin.  The 
first part of the thesis evaluates 474 electric utilities as to 
whether they had an energy efficiency program in 2010.  The 
second part of the thesis evaluates each utility’s EE program 
spending in terms of energy and utility specific factors, as well 
as socio-economic, housing stock and political variables.  
Through descriptive statistical analysis and the creation of a 
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predictable linear regression model, this thesis identifies 
relationships between the dependent variable (EE program spending 
as a % of a utility’s total revenue) and commonly cited barriers 
to EE program development.   
 Through the analysis, this study finds widespread EE 
program coverage in Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin.   Also, it 
finds states are the greatest predictor of utility energy 
efficiency program spending.  A utility’s ownership type and the 
share of homes that heat with electricity are also significant 
predictors of program spending. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: “Energy Efficiency Programs” “Energy Policy” “Rural 
Electric Cooperative” “Municipal Utility” “Investor-owned 
Utility” “Energy Efficiency Resource Standard”  
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Common Program (branded-program) – In some states, a commonly 
branded energy efficiency program exists that utilities can 
take part in.  Utilities benefit from greater scale and 
shared administration costs.  Often these programs are run 
by a third-party administrator. 
Decoupling – Decoupling is a rate adjustment mechanism that 
breaks the connection between how much energy a utility 
sells and the revenue it collects.  It helps minimize the 
conflict between selling energy for a profit and promoting 
energy efficiency. 
Demand-Side Management (DSM) - Demand-side management is the 
management of energy demand, either through incentivizing 
end-user energy efficiency or through peak-load management: 
getting end-users to lower the peak energy usage–programs 
that run dishwaters and hot water heaters at night when 
energy use is low versus the evening when energy use is 
high.  While increased energy efficiency reduces overall 
energy use, better load management can often reduce the 
need for additional electrical generation capacity.  While 
both types of demand-side management programs are important 
this research focuses on solely energy efficiency.   
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Energizing Indiana – Common program in Indiana that began in 
2011.  IOUs must participate and non-jurisdictional POUs 
are allowed to join (and most have). 
Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) – An EERS is “a 
mechanism established by law that encourages more efficient 
use of electricity and natural gas by requiring utilities 
to save a certain amount of energy either on an annual 
basis, on a cumulative basis, or both.  Utilities achieve 
these savings by implementing energy efficiency programs to 
help their customers save energy in their homes and 
businesses.” (Furrey, 2009)   
Focus on Energy – Common program in Wisconsin that has been 
around since 2005.  IOUs must contribute and participate.  
POUs either may either participate or retain their 
contribution and operate an independent program. 
Generation & Transmission Cooperative – Made-up of rural electric 
cooperatives.  G&Ts generate and/or purchase the 
electricity distributed and sold by RECs.  In some areas 
(Hoosier Energy in Indiana is a good example) a G&T 
cooperative has operated a common energy efficiency program 
for its REC members.  
Integrated-Resource Planning (IRP) – IRP is “a planning and 
selection process for new energy resources that evaluates 
the full range of alternatives, including new generating 
capacity, power purchases, energy conservation and 
efficiency, cogeneration and district heating and cooling 
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applications, and renewable energy resources, in order to 
provide adequate and reliable service to its electric 
customers at the lowest system cost.” (Energy Policy Act of 
1992)  IRP has helped utilities see energy efficiency (or 
demand-side management) as a resource and a useful 
alternative to increasing generation capacity in response 
to growing demand.   
Investor-Owned Utility (IOU) – IOUs are one of the three types of 
utilities that distribute electricity or natural gas to 
customers.  IOUs are for profit companies regulated by 
state public utility commissions. They are often very 
large, serving customers across many states. 
Load Management – Often a key component of demand-side management 
programs, load management refers to managing the way 
customers use energy.  Often this involves programs that 
get customers to switch some of their energy use from peak 
periods to times when energy demand is low. Successful load 
management programs can reduce the need for increasing 
generation capacity (i.e. new power plants). 
Municipal Utility (MU)- MUs are a publicly-owned utility operated 
by a municipality.  MUs can be large and serve cities with 
hundreds of thousands of customers or can serve small towns 
with hundreds of customers. 
Public Benefit Funds – Public benefit funds are a mechanism that 
utilities can use to recoup costs for energy efficiency 
programs. 
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Public Utility Commission (PUC) – The PUC is the state body that 
regulates utilities.  They are usually responsible for 
monitoring EERS. 
Publicly-Owned Utility (POU) – POUs include MUs and RECs.  
Because POUs are answerable to their customers via boards, 
committees and elections, they are often not regulated by 
state PUCs. 
Rural Electric (Member) Cooperative (REC or REMC) – RECs are 
utilities that serve a mainly rural customer base.  They 
were created by the federal government to serve areas of 
the country that IOUs found uneconomical to serve.  While 
some RECs are still heavily made up of farms and other 
rural customers, some have seen suburbs grow in their 
service areas. 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As energy prices rise and climate change is recognized as a 
more pressing and legitimate threat, the interest in energy 
efficiency has grown ever more in recent years.  Appliances and 
automobiles have become more efficient.  Energy efficient 
building practices are becoming more commonplace in design and 
construction.  There are even net-zero energy buildings being 
constructed, structures that produce as much energy as they use.  
Yet, one of the biggest energy drains in this country is our 
existing building stock.  For the year 2010, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration estimated that 41% of total energy 
consumption was used in buildings.   
Thankfully there are a myriad of ways to make this 
consumption more efficient.  Technological advances in lighting, 
appliances and heating systems, more efficient and green building 
practices (including the retrofitting of older buildings to 
perform more efficiently), and changing the way we use our 
buildings are just a few.  Yet many of these solutions are not 
taken advantage of due to a number of market failures.  While 
they may be more cost-effective over the course of their use, 
efficient appliances, lighting and building products usually have 
higher up-front costs and are not always adopted.  Customers 
knowingly choose less efficient products because of lower initial 
costs.  When it comes to buildings, even more barriers exist that 
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prevent sizable investments in energy efficiency.  Builders have 
traditionally not incorporated energy efficiency measures into 
construction.  Homeowners can be reluctant to make an investment 
when they might sell the home before they reap the benefits. This 
can be even more so with businesses where short-term results 
usually outweigh long-term ones.  In the case of rental units 
(residential, commercial or industrial), there’s the issue of the 
split incentive where the landlord owns the building, but the 
tenant pays the energy bill.  Landlords do not have an incentive 
to lower an energy bill they don’t pay and tenants do not have an 
incentive to invest in a property they don’t own. 
Because these barriers have prevented the free market from 
readily utilizing energy efficiency, leaders at the national, 
state and local levels have instituted an assortment of policies 
to increase energy efficiency.  Federal efficiency standards for 
automobiles have been created.  Local and state building codes 
have incorporated energy efficiency to varying degrees.  Public 
education campaigns dedicated to conservation come from the 
public, private and non-profit sphere.  In many areas of the 
country the policy toolbox now includes an array of incentives, 
rebates, loans and other services packaged together in utility-
sponsored energy efficiency programs. 
Beginning in the late 1970s with rising oil costs, the 
breadth of energy efficiency programs expanded rapidly with the 
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act which 
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required large utilities to institute energy efficiency and 
conservation programs (EIA 2000).  As energy prices decreased in 
the 1980s interest in energy efficiency waned and many programs 
were allowed to retire (Walker 1985).  In the last decade though, 
existing programs have grown exponentially and new programs are 
being created each year.  Currently there are robust programs of 
all shades and sizes being run throughout United States.   
Yet it is difficult to quantify the extent of energy 
efficiency program adaption, as well as compare the relative 
strength and size of various programs.  The National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association claims that 96% of co-ops have 
efficiency programs, 70% offer financial incentives to promote 
greater efficiency, and 73% of co-ops plan to expand their 
programs in the coming years.  Yet what constitutes an energy 
efficiency program is not defined.  Twenty-six percent of co-ops 
offer a program, but no financial benefits.  Do they offer 
financing, market-rate services, or do they simply send a How to 
Save Energy educational booklet with the annual report each year?  
The literature that has reviewed energy efficiency programs 
suggests a dearth of programs at rural electric cooperatives.  Is 
the 96% in program coverage cited by the NRECA a very recent 
phenomenon?  Or is a trade association like NRECA more generous 
in its definition of an energy efficiency program than the 
academic community? 
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Usually, the impetus for utilities to conduct an energy 
efficiency program is a state mandate.  Of the three types of 
utilities, often only investor-owned utilities (IOUs) can be 
regulated by state officials.  Rural electric cooperatives (RECs) 
and municipal utilities (MUs), collectively known as publicly-
owned utilities (POUs), are usually beyond the grasp of 
regulation since they are already answerable to the communities 
they serve via committees, boards and elections.  A review of the 
literature on energy efficiency programs suggests that generally 
POUs, have not adopted energy efficiency programs to the same 
degree that IOUs have.  Many attribute this to the exception 
given to POUs in many states’ energy efficiency mandates.   
Yet, some of the oldest and best programs in the country 
are at POUs.  Considering the relationship that POUs have to 
their customers (be they members of the REC or citizens of the 
city operating the MU), it makes sense that a POU should be able 
to design and operate a program that better fits the specific 
needs of its customers.  The localized nature of RECs and MUs 
stands in stark contrast to many IOUs, which tend to be larger, 
with service areas that span multiple states and regions of the 
country.  If a POU is able to overcome their distinct barriers to 
energy efficiency program adoption, their potential for operating 
a successful program should be greater because of the special 
relationship they have with their customers.    
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This thesis is an attempt to better understand the extent 
of energy efficiency program coverage across four Midwestern 
states with a rich variety of utility size and ownership 
structure.  Beyond simply answering the question: What percent of 
utilities have an energy efficiency program, this thesis includes 
an examination of how utility-level factors such as energy 
consumption rates, utility size, electric rates, type of customer 
base, and ownership structure predict how much a utility is 
willing to invest in energy efficiency.  Socio-demographic and 
economic factors in utilities’ service areas may also predict a 
utility’s rate of energy efficiency investment, and those 
relationships are also explored in this thesis. 
Because of the influence of state-level policies on utility 
programs, studies have often compared energy efficiency 
adaptation and funding at the state-level.  Those few studies 
that have explored utility-level programs and how factors like 
ownership structure and size influence them, have rarely done so 
quantitatively.  This research assesses energy efficiency program 
adaption at all electric utilities in Iowa, Indiana, Michigan and 
Wisconsin.  Utilities are compared based on total program 
spending as a percentage of total revenue for the year 2010.  
Factors such as state policy and history, ownership structure, 
energy use, and housing stock are evaluated in order to see how 
they might predict spending on energy efficiency. As part of this 
analysis, a regression model is built to explore relationships 
between these factors and energy efficiency spending.  
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In its broadest sense, the goal of this research is to 
increase the utilization of energy efficiency.  While utility 
programs have been essential in driving the growth of energy 
efficiency, it is imperative that all utilities, regardless of 
size, ownership type, geography, or regulation, strongly pursue 
energy efficiency.  It has been regularly claimed (Wilson, 2008; 
Fischlein, 2009; Frieschlag, 2011, Smith, 2010) that publicly-
owned utilities lag behind IOUs when it comes to investing in 
energy efficiency.  I plan to more definitively address that 
claim, as well as identify which factors are significant barriers 
to energy efficiency program development.  By doing so, I will 
show what type of utilities are lagging behind and what are the 
factors most significantly driving that deficit.  These findings 
will be helpful to policymakers, program managers, and others 
interested in energy policy.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Most of the DSM [demand-side management, aka energy 
efficiency] literature dates to the late 1980s and early 
1990s… Much of the literature has focused on implementing 
DSM in investor-owned utilities or large municipal 
utilities.  However, analyses of DSM programs have often 
ignored the unique plight of consumer-owned utilities.  
These organizations…have different institutional 
structures, and face different challenges and opportunities 
in implementing DSM programs than IOUs. (Wilson, 2008) 
Academic literature on the energy efficiency programs and 
policies of rural electric cooperatives (REC) and municipal 
utilities (MU) is not extensive.  An initial search turned up 
only a handful of articles that specifically looked at energy 
efficiency within RECs and Mus.  Many articles deal more 
generally with energy efficiency, not differentiating between 
investor-owned utilities and publicly-owned utilities.  Articles 
that deal more generally with demand-side management (DSM), 
specifically load management, are more prevalent.   
Although energy efficiency programs are usually managed at 
the utility level, many studies (Doris, 2011; Furrey, 2009; 
Nadal, 2010; Sciortino, 2011; York, 2005; Foster, 2012; Eldridge, 
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2007 & 2008) evaluate energy efficiency utilization on a state by 
state basis.  These studies emphasize the often controlling 
factor of state policy and rarely evaluate programs at the 
utility level.  Yet they are a helpful resource in assessing 
state policy. 
In addition to articles generally about DSM programs, there 
is also a growing literature that explores energy use more 
broadly.  Some articles (Tierney, 2011) explore renewable energy 
and the growth of its use by both utilities in general, and RECs 
and MUs in particular.  While renewable energy programs may be 
similar to energy efficiency programs in some respects, 
differences in utilization and cost-effectiveness make 
comparisons across the programs problematic.  More useful are 
articles (Greer, 2003, 2008) that explore the organization and 
structure of different utility types and how they have changed 
over the years.  As much of the literature suggests, it is often 
these factors that bolster or limit particular programs.   
 
2.2 Energy Efficiency at Publicly-owned Utilities 
As stated above, research into how RECs and MUs have 
pursued energy efficiency is limited.  One of the stronger 
studies (Wilson, 2008) analyzes all the RECs and small MUs across 
Minnesota.  It provides a, “background on rural co-operatives and 
municipal utilities in the context of the US electric sector and 
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highlights[s] the challenges and opportunities of implementing 
DSM programs at these institutions.”  It is a break from much of 
the energy efficiency program literature because it looks at the 
question of ownership model in each utility and how that 
influences program adaption.  The study takes a mixed research 
approach in examining program adaption at POUs across Minnesota.    
Through direct surveying of POUs, the researchers came to a 
few key findings:  
 DSM programs improve customer relations and the utility’s 
public image  
 Developing strong local partnerships are a key ingredient 
to success 
 Organizational capacity to create and manage programs was a 
strong limiting factor (especially within very small 
utilities) 
 Common market barriers to energy efficiency were identified 
in rural areas and small towns (lower incomes, access to 
energy efficiency products and specialty contractors, heavy 
residential electrical load)   
 MUs tend to be smaller, have a smaller residential load, 
and have less experience than RECs in delivering DSM 
programs   
 RECs have tended to focus more on load management programs 
than MUs.    
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Another article by the same research team, (Fischlein, 
2009) approaches the lack of energy efficiency at POUs through 
the prism of climate change and emission reductions.  While the 
paper doesn’t evaluate a set of utilities for program adaption it 
does address POUs specifically.  It notes the lack of research 
and data on POUs, that the, “majority of research either 
implicitly or explicitly focuses on IOUs.”  It cites a 2005 study 
that found program adaption at MUs and RECs at 11% and 21% 
respectively.  Yet, it also acknowledges that industry sources at 
the time suggest program adaption levels over 50%.  The 
researchers attribute much of lack of program adaption at POUs to 
a lack of regulatory authority, claiming that POUs largely govern 
themselves outside of state purview.   
Meyer (1983, explores the history of utility regulation and 
comes to a similar, though more general, conclusion regarding the 
lack of regulation at POUs.  He challenges the claim that MUs can 
better serve their customers when free from state or federal 
regulation, arguing that self-regulation encourages inefficient 
operation of services. 
Surveys and case studies of existing programs are also 
important.  One good case study, which explicitly explores 
successful energy efficiency programs instituted by RECs, begins 
with a short history of DSM programs at RECs beginning in the 
1970s and continuing into today (Frieschlag 2011).  Frieschlag 
finds that RECs do not invest in energy efficiency to the scale 
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that IOUs do, “many of these nonprofit organizations simply lack 
the member and management commitment necessary to deliver high 
performance energy saving programs.”  More specifically the study 
identifies a number of barriers experienced by RECs: lack of 
integrated resource planning, the demographics of RECs’ rural 
service areas which demand specifically tailored programs and the 
lack of contractor infrastructure need to deliver energy 
efficiency effectively.  Frieschlag (2011) also attributes a lack 
of member interest in energy efficiency as a contributing factor. 
While one of the consensuses of the literature seems to be 
that RECs with the strongest programs tend to those that are 
subject to state energy efficiency mandates, Frieschlag (2011) 
does provide a case study of an exception: Hoosier Energy.  
Hoosier Energy is a generating and transmission cooperative 
serving 18 RECs in southern Indiana which began operating DSM 
programs for its RECs in 2009.  While an EERS had already been 
passed by the Indiana legislature, it was not set to begin until 
2010 and only applied to jurisdictional utilities (of which 
Hooiser Energy’s co-ops are not).  So in many ways Hoosier 
Energy’s energy efficiency program was voluntary.  In fact 
Frieschlag (2011) attributes the program’s creation to expected 
electricity demand growth through 2028 and never mentions the 
state’s EERS.  
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2.3 State-level Policy and Energy Efficiency 
Because of the market failures that have hampered the 
energy efficiency industry throughout the decades, federal, state 
and local policies have been extremely important in increasing 
the use of energy efficiency.  While in the past building codes, 
land-use regulations and state incentives and/or rebates have 
proliferated, the recent development of state Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standards (EERS) has greatly expanded energy efficiency.   
A good introduction to policy options is (Nadal, 2010).  It 
outlines three major policy strategies that states currently use 
to advance utility DSM.  These include: integrated resource 
planning, public benefit funds, and energy efficiency resource 
standards.  The paper also defines two complimentary policies 
that have assisted the spread of DSM: decoupling and regulatory 
incentives.  
Furrey (2009) defines EERS as, “a mechanism established by 
law that encourages more efficient use of electricity and natural 
gas by requiring utilities to save a certain amount of energy 
either on an annual basis, on a cumulative basis, or both.  
Utilities achieve these savings by implementing energy efficiency 
programs to help their customers save energy in their homes and 
businesses.”   
Because of the accessibility of data at the state-level and 
the strong influence of state policy, comparisons are often done 
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at the state-level.  In an evaluation of energy efficiency 
program spending, (Nadal 2010) separates all states into 5 
different levels.  It finds higher spending levels in the 
Northeast, Upper Midwest, and the West (Figure 2.1).  The article 
also identifies states with a longer history of energy efficiency 
programs.  Those states with significant energy efficiency 
programs before 2007 tend to match those with higher spending 
levels and are concentrated in the same areas of the country. 
Figure 2.1: Spending on Electric Utility Energy Efficiency Programs as 
a Percent of Utility Revenues (2009) 
 
Source: ACEEE analysis using data from CEE and EIA2 (Nadal 2010) 
Another state-level analysis, (Sciortino 2011), shows an 
increasing adoption of EERS.  While there were only seven states 
with an EERS before 2008, twenty-six states now have them in 
place.  This report looks at the twenty states that have had an 
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EERS in place for at least two years and sees how energy savings 
results match up to goals.  It finds that generally states are 
finding success with EERS: over half of the states have exceeded 
their energy savings goals and only three states are short of 
their goals by more than 20%.  It also finds that states are 
finding success irrespective of geography or the state’s 
experience with energy efficiency programs in the past.  The 
issues that do influence program success are, “the clarity and 
appropriateness of the regulatory framework, the length of time 
allowed for program administrators to ramp-up programs, and the 
overall commitment of all parties to invest the proper resources 
to meet targets.” (Sciortino 14) 
A broad look at state-level energy efficiency policy is the 
annual ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecard.  Begun in 2007, 
this report ranks all 50 states and the District of Columbia 
based on six energy efficiency policy areas: 1) utility and 
public benefits programs and policies; 2) transportation 
policies; 3) building energy codes; 4) combined heat and power; 
5) state government initiatives; and 6) appliance efficiency 
standards.  With six annual reports released, the scorecard has 
become a reliable way to measure the relative strength of state 
energy efficiency policy over the years. 
A recent report from the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, (Doris 2011), presents a regression analysis that 
explores how state-level policy might influence energy use.  With 
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per capita residential energy use as the dependent variable, 
their analysis found EERS, high efficiency building codes and 
electricity rates to be significant and have negative 
relationships with energy use.  Incentives and rebates were not 
found significant.  In their commercial energy use analysis: 
rates, EERS, efficient building codes, and personal tax 
incentives were all found to be significant and have a negative 
relationship.   
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND DATASET 
3.1 Research Questions 
This research was driven by a desire to figure out why POUs 
haven’t established energy efficiency programs to a similar 
extent as IOUs and to figure out how best to correct that.  Yet, 
because utility-level research has been sparse (especially 
quantitative research), it became necessary to evaluate a 
population of utilities in order to see where IOUs and POUs 
actually stood in terms of program adaption and operation.  
Therefore, this study first addresses the question: 
1. Compared to investor-owned utilities, do publicly-owned 
utilities operate energy efficiency programs, and how 
does their program spending levels compare to IOUs? 
With that questioned addressed, the second part of my 
thesis goes into more depth, utilizing descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis to find relationships between energy 
efficiency program spending and factors distinct to each utility.  
The second question this study addresses is: 
2. What are the factors that influence energy efficiency 
program adaption and operation?  What is the relative 
influence of state policy, utility ownership type, energy 
use, housing stock and other factors specific to a 
utility and its service area?  
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3.2 Hypothesis 
After reviewing the literature on energy efficiency 
programs, especially those focusing on POUs, I hypothesize that 
POUs have not pursued energy efficiency in great numbers because 
they are usually exempt from state energy efficiency mandates.  
Once excluded from state minimum standards I expect POUs are less 
driven internally to pursue energy efficiency because of common 
barriers cited throughout the literature: 
o Tend to be smaller 
o Tend to be poorer 
o Are usually more rural and isolated 
o Customer base are usually heavily residential 
o Often have little or no demand growth 
o Have relatively low rates 
o Lack the political and popular will within the POU for 
energy efficiency 
o Independent culture of management and customer base 
While I expect there to be an assortment of programs at 
RECs and MUs, I expect that most POUs have not operated an energy 
efficiency program.  I also expect to find relationships between 
many of the common barriers listed above and the total program 
spending. 
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3.3 Methodology 
 The analysis of the data takes a two-step process.  First, 
the data is explored through descriptive statistics: comparison 
of means, medians, quartiles, standard deviations.  I divide up 
the data by state and analyze program spending as a percent of 
total revenue, the dependent variable.  Then the same process is 
done to the data based on ownership type.  Lastly descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variable are evaluated in terms of 
both ownership types and states. 
Data for the dependent variable, energy efficiency program 
spending as a percentage of total revenue, is then divided into 
four groups: no programs and three tiers: the upper third of 
program spending, the middle third and the lower third.  Means 
are taken for each tier for every independent variable evaluated 
and cross-tabulated.  This is done for the overall dataset as 
well as for a data-subset of only POUs and then data-subsets of 
each state’s POUs.  This is done to uncover potential 
relationships between independent variables and the dependent 
variables overall and those specific to POUs in certain states. 
 The second step of the process is a linear regression 
analysis.  Based on a literature review and preliminary data 
analysis, I create a model (Model 1) with five independent 
variables, plus three state dummy variables.  I evaluate a second 
model (Model 2), which has the same variables as Model 1 plus 
ownership type dummy variables.  These two models are regressed 
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within the overall dataset and the POU data-subset.  Then I 
subtract the state dummy variables from Models 1 and 2 to create 
Models 3 and 4 which are applied to the state/POU data-subsets.  
Changes in variable significance, coefficient strength and sign 
throughout the regressions were observed and interpreted.   
 
3.4 Data Selection  
The sheer number of utilities in the United States (over 
3,200) and the lack of consistent reporting precludes this paper 
from a quantitative exploration of energy efficiency programs at 
all utilities in all 50 states.  While all utilities are required 
to submit data to the federal Energy Information Administration, 
most do not include energy efficiency data in their submission.  
Using energy efficiency program data from the EIA-861 dataset 
would result in a sample that probably skews toward large 
utilities and those which are already required by regulation to 
operate a program and report on the results.  Since this study 
seeks to gain a better understanding of program activity at small 
and unregulated utilities, this sample would not suffice.   
Instead, this research evaluates all utilities in four 
states.  Providing an in-depth analysis of a relatively small 
number of states allows me to capture utilities that do not 
operate programs and those that operate very small programs.  The 
four states chosen: Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin and Michigan, were 
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selected because of the variety they represent in regulation, 
program management structure, history and program funding (see 
Figure 2.1).  Within each state, their variety in utility 
ownership model and size, demographics, and political persuasion 
was valued.  As roughly proximate, the four states should be 
similar in climate, culture and history, important controls.  
While other nearby states were considered for the research as 
well (Minnesota and Illinois especially), actual energy 
efficiency program spending data for the calendar year 2010 
proved most accessible in the four states chosen. 
 
3.5 State Background Energy Information  
While all four states are similar in size, population, 
geography, climate and culture, it is helpful to note the 
differences in energy use.   
 
3.5.1 Electrical Generation and Use 
 This is especially true when it comes to analyzing energy 
efficiency programs operated by electric utilities.  The type of 
fuel a state uses to power its grid and whether that fuel is 
resourced locally or imported both help set the landscape on 
which energy efficiency thrives or is under-utilized.  All state 
background data comes from the EIA state profiles. 
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 Iowa – Iowa ranks 5th in the nation for highest per capita 
energy use.  This is probably most due to the state’s large rural 
and agricultural population and large industrial base.  In 2010, 
about 72% of electrical generation in Iowa came from coal, 14% 
from renewables, 9% nuclear, and 5% natural gas.  Different than 
most states, nearly all of Iowa’s renewable energy does not come 
from hydro-electric facilities; with almost 20% of Iowa’s total 
electricity coming from wind in 2011.  It also has a relatively 
high consumption of liquefied petroleum gases (LPG, also known as 
propane) and is the nation’s largest producer of ethanol (which 
also might help explain the state’s high per capita energy use).     
 Indiana – Indiana ranks 10th in the nation in terms of 
highest per capita energy use.  While Indiana also has a sizable 
rural population, it has more urban and suburban areas than Iowa 
(20% of electricity goes to residential use compared to 16% for 
Iowa).  Its high energy use might better reflect the state’s lack 
of investment in energy efficiency rather than other geographic 
or economic factors.  Considering the state is one of the 
nation’s leaders in coal production, Indiana generates most of 
their electricity from coal, upwards of 87% in 2010.  Twelve 
percent was from natural gas and only 1% came from non-hydro 
renewables, although the largest geothermal heating and cooling 
system in the United States is being built in Muncie.  Indiana is 
also a major producer of ethanol. 
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 Michigan – Michigan is ranked 35th in highest per capita 
energy use.  This is probably due both to the large urban areas 
in Michigan and to the state’s relatively lower industrial share 
of energy use (only 25% compared to 49% in Iowa and 45% in 
Indiana).  The state also has a high utilization of natural gas 
resources, both because of the large reserves and storage 
capacity in the state.  Still, in 2010, Michigan generated 57% of 
its electricity from coal, 23% from nuclear, 18% from natural 
gas, and 3% from non-hydroelectric renewables (primarily 
biomass).   
 Wisconsin – Wisconsin is ranked 26th in highest per capita 
energy use.  The state is very similar to Michigan; its larger 
share of industrial use (32% to 25%) help account for the higher 
per capita energy use.  Also similar to Michigan, Wisconsin 
generated 57% of its electricity from coal, 19% from nuclear, 17% 
from natural gas, 4% from non-hydro renewables and 3% from hydro-
electric facilities.  Wisconsin is also a major producer of 
ethanol. 
 
3.5.2 Home Heating Fuels 
The variety of home heating fuels that a state’s households 
use is also important to a state’s energy use portfolio.  
Generally in the United States, natural gas is the most common 
heating fuel, supplying 50% to 60% of the population for the past 
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50 years.  Since it is delivered by a pipeline infrastructure, 
generally the more rural an area is, the less likely it has 
access to natural gas.  Because of the price, efficiency and ease 
of delivery, natural gas is usually the first option when 
available.  Wherever natural gas isn’t available, consumers must 
choose between electricity, LPG, oil or wood.  Electricity tends 
to have higher shares of use where heating loads are lighter (the 
Southeast, Southwest, and Pacific Northwest).  Historically, 
electricity use for heating has been a severely inefficient way 
to heat a home (especially in cold climates) and early energy 
efficiency programs often targeted those homes for efficiency 
measures.  It should be noted though that recent advances in heat 
pump technology and greater adoption of weatherization strategies 
have allowed for more efficient electric heating.   
In the Mountain West, Plain States, and Midwest, propane is 
used when natural gas isn’t available and electricity hasn’t been 
used.  In the Northeast, oil is the fuel of choice when natural 
gas isn’t available.  In some Northeastern states over half the 
homes are heated with oil.  Not only does this lead to volatile 
heating costs as the price of oil changes, but as the price has 
gone up, the Northeast’s reliance on oil heat has become a 
liability.  Wood is the other fuel that is used substantially 
across the United States.  While many use wood as a supplemental 
fuel source, there are many states where a sizable population 
uses it as its main heat source.  Those states (ID, ME, MT, NH, 
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NM, OR, VT – all over 6%) tend to have a sizable rural 
population, extensive forests and lack major metropolitan areas.   
Table 3.1: Home Heating Fuel Shares - 2010 
Home Heating 
Fuel Iowa Indiana Michigan Wisconsin 
Natural Gas 65.8% 63.0% 78.0% 66.1% 
LPG (Propane) 13.8% 7.9% 9.2% 11.0% 
Electricity 16.2% 24.9% 7.0% 13.0% 
Oil 1.1% 1.4% 2.0% 4.4% 
Wood 1.6% 1.9% 2.8% 4.3% 
Source: U.S. Census 2010 5-year ACS data 
The four states in this research are similar in heating 
fuel variety and are good examples of the variety in the Midwest 
(Table 3.1).  There are some peculiarities to note though.  
Probably because of its more southern position geographically, 
Indiana has a higher proportion of electricity use for heat.  All 
show similar natural gas use except for Michigan which is much 
higher.  This is maybe due to a substantial gas reserve in 
Michigan and one of largest natural gas storage capacities of any 
state in the country.  Wisconsin, with more acres of forest than 
either Indiana or Iowa, shows a higher wood use, while Iowa has 
slightly more LPG use. 
 
3.5.3 State Energy Efficiency Policies  
A state’s energy efficiency policy often has the greatest 
influence on energy efficiency program spending.  Both past and 
present energy policy can have an effect.  While all four states 
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examined currently have energy efficiency resource standards, 
their timelines of implementation, savings target levels, and 
jurisdiction varies (Table 3.2).   
Table 3.2: Energy Efficiency Resource Standards 
State  Savings Target Standard applies to… Status of 
POUs in 
2010 
Ind.     
– 
EERS 
Enact
ed 
2009 
Entire 
Industry – 
0.3% annual 
savings in 
2010, 
increasing to 
1.1% in 2014, 
and leveling 
at 2% in 2019 
All jurisdictional utilities 
submit 3-year DSM plans – 
which includes all IOUs and 
any POUs who have not opted 
out of jurisdiction 
All EE 
programs 
voluntary 
Iowa         
- 
EERS 
Enact
ed 
2009 
Individual 
Utilities – 
Varies by 
utility from 
1% to 1.5% 
annually by 
2013  
IOUs, who must submit 3-year 
plans; MUs and RECs are 
required to implement energy 
efficiency programs, set 
energy savings goals, create 
plans to achieve those 
goals, and report to the IUB 
on progress, although saving 
target standards do not 
apply. 
POUs must 
implement 
EE 
programs, 
but POUs 
are free to 
set their 
own targets 
Mich. 
– 
EERS 
Enact
ed 
2008 
Entire 
Industry – 
0.3% annual 
savings in 
2009, ramping 
up to 1% in 
2012 and 
thereafter 
All utilities, saving 
targets are split between 
IOUs and POUs based on their 
respective shares of sales; 
for all utilities a spending 
cap exists. 
Energy 
saving 
standards 
and 
spending 
cap applies 
to all POUs  
Wisc. 
– 
EERS 
Enact
ed 
2010 
Entire 
Industry – 
0.75% in 2011, 
2012 and 2013 
All utilities who 
participate in Focus on 
Energy (FOE) – only IOUs are 
required to participate, 
contributing at least 1.2% 
of their gross revenue; POUs 
must either contribute about 
0.4% or retain their 
contribution and operate a 
Commitment to Community 
(CTC) program.   
EERS was 
not in 
effect 
until 2011, 
all POU 
programs 
voluntary 
or in 
preparation 
for 2011 
standard 
Source: ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Policy Database, State PUC 
Reports  
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Of the four states, only Michigan’s EERS does not make a 
distinction between POUs and IOUs.  Indiana’s EERS applies to all 
POUs that have not opted out of jurisdiction (which means POUs 
are only regulated in Indiana as long as they’d like to be).  
Iowa’s EERS requires POUs to implement programs, set energy 
saving goals, create plans to achieve those goals, and report to 
the Iowa Utilities Board on their progress.  Yet the minimum 
energy savings targets set out in the EERS do not apply to POUs.  
Iowa’s POUs are allowed to set their own goals, however minimal 
they’d like them to be.  Wisconsin’s EERS applies to the state-
branded program Focus on Energy (FOE) of which only IOUs are 
required to contribute and participate.  POUs in Wisconsin either 
can contribute to FOE (about 1/3 of what IOUs contribute) or 
retain their contribution and operate an independent Commitment 
to Community program in their own service area – which they are 
then required to report on. 
The historical legacy of energy policy in these states is 
also important.  During the 1980s, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin 
all had energy efficiency programs operating in their states.  
Yet much of that changed in the 1990s.  According to ACEEE’s 
State Energy Efficiency Policy Database, “Michigan had a history 
of fairly aggressive energy efficiency programs until 1995, when 
demand-side management and integrated resource planning were 
discontinued during the move toward electric restructuring.  
Michigan had essentially no utility-sector energy efficiency 
programs from 1996 until 2008.”  While Wisconsin’s and Iowa’s 
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programs did not disappear, they did not see increasing 
utilization until the last decade culminating in the passage of 
EERS.  Indiana historically has not had any significant energy 
efficiency programs.   
This historical legacy is evident in the first annual ACEEE 
State Energy Efficiency Scorecard created in 2007 (Figure 3.1).  
In it both Wisconsin and Iowa rank in the low teens, while 
Michigan and Indiana rank 33 and 41 respectively.  By the 2012 
Scorecard, after the reimplementation of energy efficiency 
programs in Michigan, the state had jumped up to 12
th
 right behind 
Iowa.  Indiana still lags quite far behind.  While Michigan’s and 
Indiana’s EERS were passed within one year of each other and have 
similar energy saving goals, Michigan has had much better 
results.  While Indiana was still designing their system, 
Michigan’s was in full swing.   
Considering it takes acts of legislature to enact EERS, 
it’s curious how politics have influenced the operation of EERS.  
While their EERS sets an energy saving minimum, the Michigan 
legislature decided to also cap the amount of money that 
utilities can spend on their energy efficiency programs.  
“Spending for each utility is limited to 0.75% of total sales 
revenues in 2009, 1.0% in 2010, 1.5% in 2011, and 2.0% in 2012 
and each year thereafter.” (ACEEE State Policy Database)  In 
Wisconsin following the 2010 conservative victories in state 
elections, the legislature capped energy efficiency spending so 
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severely that the minimum savings standards in the EERS had to be 
lowered.  Spending caps are a somewhat odd addition to energy 
efficiency programs considering that the programs tend to only 
fund cost-effective measures in the first place.   
Figure 3.1: ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecard 
 
Source: ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecards 2006-2012 
 
3.6 Dataset 
The dataset represents all the 474 electric utilities 
operating in the states of Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin.  When appropriate, utilities headquartered outside of 
these states that serve customers in these four states were 
included.  Utilities that serve customers in more than one of the 
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states examined are separated by their state designation and 
considered separate utilities (which is how they operate in 
respect to state regulatory bodies). 
One of the reasons that Midwestern states were chosen for 
this research is the rich variety of utility ownership structure, 
geography, and size.  They are either an investor-owned utility 
(IOU) or a publicly-owned utility (POU).  Within POUs they are 
either a rural electric cooperative (REC) or a municipal utility 
(MU).   
Table 3.3: Shares of Utilities, Sales and Customers by Ownership Type 
All 
N=474 
# of 
Utilities 
Share of 
Sales (mWhs) 
Share of 
Customers 
Average # of 
Customers 
IOUs 28 82% 81% 356,538 
REC 116 9% 11% 11,478 
MU 330 9% 8% 3,179 
Small MU 292 41% 45% 1,614 
Large MU 38 59% 55% 15,204 
Source: EIA-861 (2010) 
While IOUs only account for 6% of the 474 utilities, they 
are responsible for 82% of electric sales and serve 81% of the 
customers (Table 3.3).  Both RECs and MUs (especially small MUs) 
are much smaller in size and tend to serve more rural areas.  
IOUs serve all types of customers: urban, suburban, and rural; in 
more populated areas their service areas tend to be contiguous, 
occasionally broken up by a MU.  In suburban areas there tends to 
be some overlap between RECs and IOUs, with more MUs mixed in.  
In the heavily rural areas, IOU territory snakes along major 
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roads with RECs serving the customers along smaller roads.  Small 
towns and villages are served by a mix of IOUs, MUs, and RECs.   
The utility mix in each state varies as well.  Iowa is 
characterized by a large number of small MUs (28% of the entire 
dataset consists of small MUs in Iowa).  MUs and RECs in Iowa 
have a larger market share than POUs in the other states, about 
28%, split evenly between RECs and MUs.  RECs in Iowa are 
concentrated in the most rural pockets of the state, generally 
not serving even small towns or villages.  They appear to not 
have experienced much suburban encroachment.   
Indiana’s RECs however have found themselves serving many 
suburban customers.  While RECs do not serve traditional town and 
village centers in Indiana, many subdivisions have popped up in 
their territory.  Of the four states Indiana has the largest 
share of customers served by RECs (17%).   
Like Indiana, Michigan’s RECs appear to have a more 
suburban look than other states.  Michigan is also characterized 
by having many fewer utilities than other states, only 58 (Table 
3.4).  This is especially true with small MUs and RECs.  While 
they do have many fewer small MUs, Michigan is tied with Indiana 
for having the most amount of large MUs including 3 of the top 8. 
Wisconsin has the most IOUs of any of the states, including 
a number of small regional IOUs.  RECs tend to be concentrated in 
the central, northern and western parts of the state.  While RECs 
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in Wisconsin don’t seem to have experienced the suburban 
encroachment that Indiana’s or Michigan’s RECs have, they tend to 
include more towns and village centers than the other states. 
Table 3.4: Ownership Type by State 
 IOUs RECs Small MUs Large MUs Total 
Iowa 3 41 133 3 180 
Indiana 5 41 60 12 118 
Michigan 8 10 28 12 58 
Wisconsin 12 24 71 11 118 
Total 28 116 292 38 474 
Source: EIA-861 (2010) 
 
3.6.1 Dependent Variable 
Through this research, I explore factors that help predict 
the volume of community investment in energy efficiency through 
programs operated at their electric utility.  Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standards are either set as minimum energy saving as a 
percent of total sales or as minimum program expenditures as a 
percent of total revenue.  Because I am interested in utilities 
and their commitment to energy efficiency, I choose to focus on 
program funding rather than energy savings, which are more a 
measure of program design and efficiency.  The dependent variable 
in this research is a utility’s energy efficiency program 
spending as a percentage of their total revenue.    
Total energy efficiency program expenditures for the 
calendar year 2010 were collected from a combination of each 
state’s public utility commission and/or the utilities 
themselves.  These data include residential, commercial, 
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industrial, and agricultural programs.  Although efforts were 
made to gather as uniform data as possible, each state has 
different minimum standards and reporting procedures.   What a 
utility in Wisconsin might report as part of their energy 
efficiency program, a utility in Iowa might consider as part of 
their general service and not energy efficiency.  As a rule, load 
management and general education programs were excluded.  On some 
occasions utilities submitted their energy efficiency program 
spending combined with their load management or renewable energy 
program spending.  On those occasions the utility was contacted 
and an energy efficiency program spending total was clarified.   
 
3.6.2 Independent Variables 
My independent variables fall into four categories: 
energy/utility, socio-economic, housing stock, and political.  
Energy and utility data come from the Energy Information Agency 
(EIA-861).  Two of the most critical energy/utility variables 
that may explain variations in energy efficiency program 
investment are electric rates and electric energy use.  Because 
rates often vary within a utility based on customer class and 
volume, the rate variable is calculated by dividing a utility’s 
total revenue ($) by their total sales (kWh).  I believe that 
rates will have a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable.  It’s logical to think that where the price of 
33 
 
electricity is higher, the demand for energy efficiency will be 
greater.   
Electric energy use is calculated by dividing residential 
sales (kWh) by residential customers.  Residential sales and 
customers are used to generate a proxy for normalized energy use 
rather than total sales and customers because when commercial and 
industrial customers are included, the energy use data is heavily 
influenced by the customer class mix (per customer industrial use 
is much higher than per customer residential use) and communities 
with energy-intensive industries will have high averages for 
energy use.  This variable is difficult to predict.  On one hand, 
communities that use more energy should have more of an incentive 
to invest in energy efficiency and therefore energy use should 
have a positive relationship with the dependent variable.  On the 
other hand, a community that has had an energy efficiency program 
for many years might already exhibit low energy use. 
Wilson (2008) cites size as one of the key barriers to EE 
program development at POUs.  I evaluate a utility’s size by 
examining both total customers and total sales (kWh) data.  I 
expect size to have a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable, EE spending as a % of total revenue.   
The other two energy/utility variables I examine are 
percent of customers that are residential and percent of sales 
that are residential.  Both variables attempt to test the 
assertion that a heavy residential customer base is a common 
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barrier to energy efficiency program development (Wilson, 2008 
and others).  I expect to find a positive relationship between 
residential customers or load and the dependent variable. 
Table 3.5: Independent Variables  
 Variable Source 
Energy / 
Utility 
-State (Dummy) 
-Ownership Type (Dummy) 
-Total Customers  
-Total Sales 
-Electric Rate 
-Residential Electric 
Energy Use 
-% of Customers are 
Residential 
-% of Sales are 
Residential 
EIA-861 
Socio-economic -Mean Household Income  
-% of population 25 or 
older w/ Bachelor’s 
Degree or higher 
2010 5-year ACS  – 
township-level data 
aggregated based on 
utility electric 
service area 
Housing Stock % of Housing units which 
are:  
-Owner-occupied  
-Single Family Houses  
-Mobile Homes  
-Built before 1940  
-Built after 1979  
-% of Housing units 
heated with:  
-Gas 
-LPG (Propane)  
-Electricity  
-Wood 
2010 5-year ACS – 
township-level data 
aggregated based on 
utility electric 
service area 
Political -% of residents who voted 
for President Obama in 
2008 
State election 
websites – county-
level data aggregated 
based on utility 
electric service area 
 
I include a number of variables to represent socio-economic 
factors and characteristics of the housing stock that may impact 
the demand for energy efficiency.  All are taken from the 2010 5-
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year American Community Survey (ACS).  Data are collected at the 
municipal and township level, weighted, and combined according 
the service areas of utilities.   
Because of the non-contiguous nature of electric utility 
service areas, it is difficult to assign ACS data to individual 
utilities.  The data in this research are a reasonable attempt to 
assign township-level data to utilities.  Indiana and Wisconsin 
were done in near identical ways.  In each a detailed statewide 
map with both utility service territories and township boundaries 
was used to assign each township an electric utility.  If a 
municipal utility was in the township, then the utility was 
assigned to the township.  If a township had a mix of providers, 
it was generally assigned to the provider who serviced the most 
territory in the township.  Exceptions were made when a large 
town or small city appeared to be the bulk of the township’s 
households in which case whichever provider served the populated 
area was assigned to the township.   
Iowa was done in a similar way to Wisconsin and Indiana, 
except a service territory map could not be found that had 
township boundaries, only county lines.  So townships could not 
be assigned based on which provider served the bulk of the 
township.  Except for townships served entirely by IOUs or 
containing a MU, nearly every township in Iowa is served by both 
a REC and IOU with the IOU serving the more populated area of the 
township.  Since the goal is to get a good picture of a utility’s 
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customers, if a township was serviced by a REC in any significant 
way, it was assigned to that REC unless the township had more 
than 1,000 households.  Then it was assumed that a substantial 
majority of the township’s households were concentrated in the 
populated areas and thus served by the IOU.  In Michigan there 
was not a detailed service territory map available.  But the 
state’s public utility commission’s website does provide a list 
of electric provider by city, town, and township.  That was used 
to assign a list of cities, towns, and townships to each utility.   
Once each of the states’ utilities had a list of cities, 
towns, and townships assigned, then township-level data was 
aggregated and averaged on a weighted basis (per number of 
households, adults over 25, or housing units depending on the 
variable).  This left a clear estimate for each independent 
variable. 
Socio-economic data includes mean household income and 
educational attainment.  In a study of Minnesota POUs, Wilson 
(2008) cites low incomes as a common barrier to program 
development.  By estimating mean household income for each 
utilities service area, I am able to test this assumption. I 
expect income to have a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable.  To evaluate whether the education level of a utility’s 
customers helps predict EE program spending, I look at the 
percent of population over 25 with at least a Bachelor’s degree.  
Considering that a lack of information has traditionally been a 
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barrier to energy efficiency, I expect that a more educated 
population (and presumably more informed) would be more likely to 
lobby their utility and support energy efficiency programs. 
The type of housing an area has certainly influences its 
energy use and could potentially influence demand for energy 
efficiency.  While some variables like the age or how many 
housing units are in the building affect energy usage, other 
variables like percentage of rental units relate to the issue of 
a split-incentive and the problems it creates for energy 
efficiency.  Overall, I consider the following types of housing 
stock date (the percentage of households that are): single family 
residences, mobile homes, built after 1979, built before 1940 and 
owner-occupied.   
It’s difficult to hypothesize relationships for many of 
these variables.  For instance, because older homes tend to use 
more energy than newer homes, a community with a high percentage 
of the older variety should logically have a greater demand for 
energy efficiency. Yet older homes also present many structural 
roadblocks to energy efficiency like older wiring, moisture 
issues and potential access problems.  So it’s possible that an 
area with older housing would be less likely to invest in energy 
efficiency because of these barriers.  Likewise, high percentages 
of mobile homes and rental units could suggest an area greatly in 
need of creative energy efficiency programs, but the barriers 
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that mobile homes and the split-incentive create would actually 
prohibit programs from being developed. 
Additionally I include data on how people heat their homes, 
the percent of households that heat with: natural gas, LPG 
(propane), electricity and wood.  Of these four types, the use of 
electricity to heat is the variable most likely to have a 
relationship with how an area’s utility invests in energy 
efficiency.  Traditionally, electric heat has been the most 
energy-intensive way to heat a space and therefore has been 
targeted by energy efficiency programs for decades.  While higher 
shares of electric heat would be an argument for more energy 
efficiency spending, it’s also likely that lower shares could 
indicate an area that has already aggressively targeted electric 
heat in past programs and therefore indicates an area that 
strongly favors energy efficiency.  The preponderance of electric 
heat is also geographic, the more south one goes the more likely 
that the heat is electrically provided.  In this research Indiana 
has higher rates of electric heat than the other states and it is 
also more south than the others. 
I also explore a political variable in this research.  When 
state-level energy efficiency investments are compared nationally 
(see Figure 2.1), states on the Pacific Coast and in the 
Northeast tend to lead the nation, followed closely by states in 
the Upper Midwest.  States in the South, Lower Midwest, 
Southwest, Mountain West and Plains states tend to lag behind.  
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Is it a coincidence that the more energy efficient states also 
tend to vote for Democrats in Presidential elections while those 
that lag behind support Republicans?  This variable explores that 
connection at the county and utility-level.   
The percent each county voted for President Barack Obama in 
2008 was collected from state election websites.  These 
percentages were then attached to the township and city data and 
aggregated by weighted average the same way ACS data was 
combined. 
  
40 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1.1 Energy Efficiency Programs? Yes or No? 
Much of the literature on energy efficiency programs 
suggests that IOUs are more likely to operate programs than RECs 
or MUs (Wilson, 2008; Fischlein, 2009; Frieschlag, 2011, Smith, 
2010).  This is traditionally attributed to a state regulatory 
framework that sets energy efficiency standards for IOUs while 
exempting POUs.  The four states in this thesis regulate 
utilities differently when it comes to energy efficiency.  This 
variety in regulation helps explain the different levels of 
program coverage in each of the states.   
Of the 474 utilities examined 78% operated energy 
efficiency programs in 2010 (Table 4.1).  Michigan, with its 
clear policy that requires IOUs and POUs to offer a program had 
100% coverage.  Wisconsin also found every utility in the state 
spending part of their budget on energy efficiency, either 
through the state-branded program Focus on Energy or operating an 
independent program.  Although Wisconsin had complete coverage in 
2010, their EERS was not to take effect until 2011.  Since 
Wisconsin has had energy efficiency programs for decades now, 
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it’s likely that most utilities have chosen to pursue energy 
efficiency voluntarily over the past few years.   
Table 4.1: Percentage of Utilities with Energy Efficiency Programs by 
State and Ownership Type (2010) 
State IOU 
Large 
MU 
Small 
MU REC 
All Number of 
Utilities 
Iowa 
67%* 100% 95% 98% 96% 180 
Ind. 
100% 0% 0% 41% 19% 118 
Mich. 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 58 
Wisc. 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 118 
All 
96% 68% 77% 76% 78% 474 
Note: *Only the two large IOUs operate programs in Iowa.  The third IOU 
is the Amana Colony, a Mennonite like religious community.  They are 
very small and likely exempted from the state regulations. 
 
While Iowa requires a certain energy saving standard of its 
IOUs, it instructs its POUs to operate an energy efficiency 
program, set goals and report on the results.  Yet it does not 
set minimum standards for the programs or goals.  Still though, 
170 of the 177 POUs in Iowa operated programs in 2010.  
Considering there’s still a voluntary nature to programs at POUs 
in Iowa, it’s good to see such high numbers of program coverage.  
Fully 96% of Iowan utilities operate programs.  In 2010, 
utilities in Indiana had not fully adopted the recently passed 
EERS and therefore there were no energy efficiency program 
requirements in the state.  All five of the IOUs and almost half 
of the RECs operated programs.  Overall less than 20% of 
utilities spent on energy efficiency in Indiana.   
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4.1.2 Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue 
Once levels of program coverage have been established, I 
move on to analyzing levels of spending for those programs.  
First, I evaluate the dependent variable, program spending 
normalized by a utility’s total revenue, in terms of the state 
variable.  Second, I look at the dependent variable solely in 
terms of ownership type.  Next, state and ownership variables are 
combined and I look for trends.  Finally, I split up the 
utilities into four segments based on the strength of their 
dependent variable value and look for potential relationships 
with the independent variables. 
Based on a review of state medians and means for utility 
program spending, the “average utility” in Iowa and Michigan has 
greater levels of EE spending than the “average utility” in 
Wisconsin or Indiana (Table 4.2).  Aside from having the highest 
mean spending/revenue, Iowa also has the greatest dispersion 
among its utilities.  Its standard deviation is more than twice 
those of the other states.  Considering that Iowa only requires 
minimum program standards of two of its utilities, that leaves 
the vast majority of utilities free to set their own standards.  
While that does result it low levels of funding at some utilities 
it also results in some high spending at others (Figure 4.1). 
In contrast Michigan has the most specific instructions to 
its utilities in terms of program spending and energy saving 
goals.  It requires the same minimum energy saving standard for 
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all utilities, as well as imposing a spending cap.  This might 
help explain Michigan’s low standard deviation and smaller 
dispersion than Iowa’s or Wisconsin. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue, Specific to 
State Data-subsets 
State N Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Iowa 180 0.95% 0.75% 0.91% 
Indiana 118 0.08% 0.00% 0.20% 
Michigan 58 0.85% 0.85% 0.35% 
Wisconsin 118 0.60% 0.47% 0.40% 
All 474 0.63% 0.47% 0.71% 
 
Figure 4.1: Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue, 
State Factor 
 
Note: This box plot shows both the range: the solid black lines, and 
the 1st and 3rd quartiles: the boxes.  So many of Indiana’s utilities 
have 0% program spending that the 3rd quartile for the state is at 0. 
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44 
 
Wisconsin is similar to both Iowa and Michigan.  In 2010 
Wisconsin did not have an EERS in effect and therefore did not 
impose clear standards upon all utilities.  Like Iowa, Wisconsin 
has a greater dispersion than Michigan with higher spending 
outliers.  However, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, Wisconsin’s box 
plot, the heart of its data, is below Michigan’s. 
 Program spending at Indianan utilities hardly even shows up 
on the box plot in Figure 4.1.  The 3
rd
 quartile of the data is at 
0 and only the few IOUs and RECs with programs show up in the 
range. 
Figure 4.2: Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue, 
Ownership Type Factor 
 
Note: This box plot shows both the range: the solid black lines, and 
the 1st and 3rd quartiles: the boxes.   
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 From a comparison of box plots (Figures 4.1 and 4.2), 
ownership type appears to have less of an influence over the 
dependent variable.  All four types are concentrated between 0 
and 1%.  While the dispersions for small MUs and IOUs rise up 
above 3% and 4%, the bulk of each type’s spending/revenue is 
similar. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue, Specific to 
Ownership Type Data-subsets   
Ownership N Mean Median Stand. Dev. 
IOU 28 0.97% 0.94% 0.77% 
Large MU 38 0.55% 0.58% 0.48% 
Small MU 292 0.59% 0.38% 0.77% 
REC 116 0.68% 0.55% 0.57% 
All 474 0.63% 0.47% 0.71% 
 
 Looking at means and medians, a difference emerges (Table 
4.3).  IOUs exhibit the highest spending levels, almost 1%.  RECs 
appear to have the next highest average with a mean of 0.68% and 
a median of 0.55%.  MUs have the lowest funding levels with small 
MUs’ mean slightly higher than large MUs, but their median much 
lower at 0.38%.  Unlike the state comparisons, there is not as 
much variance in standard deviation within the ownership data-
subsets.  IOUs and small MUs have the highest, with RECs not far 
behind.  Only large MUs have a relatively concentrated dataset.  
Based on my belief that states control more for program/spending 
variance than ownership type, it makes sense that the former’s 
dispersions would be smaller.  The greater dispersions (standard 
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deviations) in the ownership types suggest that the data is being 
dispersed by more controlling factors (i.e. states). 
When a box plot of states and ownerships types is create 
(Figure 4.3) more trends begin to emerge.  I am able to see how 
ownership types rank in certain states, whether a pattern follows 
in each state or just one.  Also, I am able to see where trends 
run opposite each other within individual states. 
Figure 4.3: Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue, 
States and Ownership Types 
 
Note: This box plot shows both the range: the solid black lines, and 
the 1st and 3rd quartiles: the boxes.  Much of Indiana’s data are 0, 
including all of MU-L and MU-S and over half of REC.   
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numbers (the third IOU, Amana Society Services, serves the Amana 
Colonies, a Mennonite-like community and must be excluded from 
regulation as they do not offer a program).  Thirteen of the top 
14 utilities in the overall dataset are small MUs and RECs in 
Iowa. And the averages for large MUs and RECs in Iowa are higher 
than any other ownership category in any other state.  The 
relative high numbers for all types of utilities in Iowa is a 
strong argument for the controlling factor of the state variable. 
With Indiana’s data-subset dominated by utilities without 
EE programs, only the IOUs and RECs show data above zero.  Even 
with over half of Indiana’s RECs not operating programs (and 
therefore with 0% for spending/revenue) RECs still have greater 
mean spending/revenue (0.21%) than IOUs (0.12%).  For just the 17 
RECs that have EE programs the mean average in 2010 was 0.51%, 
which is not that much below the overall average for RECs across 
all four states. 
After Iowa, Michigan performs the best of the three 
remaining states.  Like Iowa, IOUs and RECs have the best results 
followed by large MUs and then small MUs.  Unlike the other 
states, RECs in Michigan have spending levels on par with IOUs. 
Average spending/revenue numbers in Wisconsin tend to better 
represent what some studies have suggested: that IOUs invest 
more, followed by large MUs and then small MUs and RECs. 
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4.1.3 Cross-tabulation Analysis 
As part of the analysis process, the dependent variable, 
program spending as % of revenue, is divided into four segments.  
First, utilities without programs are grouped together and then 
the remaining 360 utilities are divided into three groups of 123, 
123 and 124.  Then mean averages are taken for each group within 
each independent variable.  (Median averages were used for total 
customers and total sales because of the extreme variation in 
utility size.)  This process is not only done for all the 
utilities, but also within each state and ownership model.  This 
helps identify where possible relationships exist between the 
independent and dependent variables, controlling for both the 
state and ownership factors.   
Table 4.4: States and Shares of Spending/revenue Tiers 
States IA IN MI WI 
Upper Third 
42% 1% 43% 18% 
Middle Third 
22% 8% 48% 39% 
Lower Third 
31% 10% 9% 43% 
No Program 
4% 82% 0% 0% 
All 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
 Table 4.4 shows the four states broken down into shares for 
each spending/revenue tier.  Iowa shows sizable shares of the 
data.  Considering that 38% of the total utilities are in Iowa 
this makes sense.  Iowa has many utilities dispersed throughout 
the dataset (upper – 42%, middle - 22% and lower - 31% of Iowa’s 
49 
 
utilities), while nearly all of Indiana’s utilities (82%) did not 
operate a program in 2010.  Michigan’s utilities are concentrated 
in the upper and middle thirds of the data, 43% and 48% 
respectively.  On the other hand, Wisconsin’ utilities are 
concentrated in the middle and lower thirds, 39% and 43% 
respectively. 
 Table 4.5 is similar to Table 4.4, but it shows ownership 
type shares.  Over half of IOUs (54%) are in the upper third of 
spending.  Small MUs are concentrated more on the lower spectrum 
of spending, while RECs tend to be more on the upper end.  
Similar to the analysis of Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2, the 
evaluation of ownership type independent of the state variable is 
limited. 
Table 4.5: Ownership Types and Shares Spending/revenue Tiers 
Ownership IOU MU-L MU-S REC 
Upper Third 
54% 19% 21% 35% 
Middle Third 
19% 40% 25% 25% 
Lower Third 
25% 10% 31% 18% 
No Program 
3% 31% 23% 22% 
All 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
After examining the tiers of spending/revenue data in terms 
of states and ownership types, I look at the independent 
variables for potential relationships. Tables 4.6-4.8 show the 
mean averages for each of the potential 18 independent variables 
at each of the four tiers of spending/revenue.  I do this 
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calculation in the six datasets and data-subsets that are 
included in the regression analysis.  These include overall 
dataset, the POU data-subset and then each of the four state/POU 
data-subsets.  Using these six allow me to see potential trends 
overall, within only POUs and then within POUs in particular 
states. 
Looking at the overall dataset, a few variables show signs 
of a potential relationship (bolded and italicized).  Size, both 
total customers and total sales, suggests a positive 
relationship.  Because of the wide dispersion of utility size 
(extremely large utilities in the upper and lower thirds), 
medians are presented in Table 4.6.  Total sales appears to be 
positive in POUs, IA and MI, while total customers suggests 
positive relationships in just IA and MI.  Only the Indiana data-
subset suggests a negative relationship with size.  The data in 
Indiana does show that utilities that do not operate programs are 
much smaller than those that do. 
Both percentage of customers that are residential (% res 
cust) and percentage of sales that are residential (% res load) 
suggest positive relationships–that the higher percent of 
residential customers and sales, the greater relative investment 
in energy efficiency.  Either one or both of these variables 
appears to have a positive relationship in every data-subset 
except for Indiana.  This is curious because a large residential 
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load or customer base has been seen as a barrier to energy 
efficiency programs. 
Two other variables that suggest a potential relationship 
overall are % Obama voters and % mobile homes, both negative.  
When the relationship between political leanings and program 
spending is considered at the state-level (Figure 2-1), it 
appears there’s a positive relationship between spending and 
Democratic support.  Yet, within the overall dataset, as well as 
the POU data-subset, the data is suggesting that the relationship 
is negative.  In Michigan however, % Obama voters appears to have 
a positive relationship.   The other, % mobile homes, suggests a 
negative relationship.  When broken down, relationships appear to 
be a mix of positive (IA and IN) and negative (POUs and WI). 
The heating fuel variable data also hint at potential 
relationships.  People that heat their homes with electricity 
have traditionally been one of the low-hanging fruit that utility 
energy efficiency programs have targeted first.  Overall, there 
appears to be a positive relationship between % elect heat and 
spending/revenue.  This also looks to be the case within POUs and 
Iowa.  The % wood heat variable suggests a negative overall 
relationship.  Within subsets it looks both positive (IA) and 
negative (POUs and WI).  These breakdowns are similar to the 
subset splits for % mobile homes.  Since both variables are 
potential proxies for how rural an area is, these relationships 
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help hint at the overall relationship between program spending 
and how rural an area is.   
 At this level of analysis, I didn’t find much potential for 
relationships between the dependent variable and income, 
electricity rates, energy use, educational attainment or many of 
the housing stock variables.  For some of the variables like 
rate, energy use and educational attainment, the problem is 
likely how the variable was calculated.  Unlike the variable 
total sales, a variable like rate has little variability in its 
numbers and therefore little room to indicate relationships.  My 
calculation for rate (total sales / total revenue) might be too 
simple to create a dataset with enough variability to show 
relationships.  In future studies it would be preferable to find 
a calculation for these variables that creates more variability 
in the data.  
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Table 4.6: Cross-tabulation of Dependent Variable with State and 
Ownership Variables I 
Data
set 
Tier
s N 
Spendi
ng/rev
enue 
Total 
Cust. 
Median 
Total 
Sales 
(mWh)  
Median 
Rate 
(¢/k
Wh) 
Res 
Energ
y Use 
(MWh/
cust.
) 
% 
Res. 
Cust. 
% 
Res. 
Load 
Over
all 
Up. 123 1.540% 3,185 80,159 9.9 10.98 86.8% 50.4% 
Mid. 123 .654% 2,586 45,584 10.2 9.87 86.0% 49.0% 
Low. 124 .245% 1,395 28,000 9.8 10.33 84.5% 44.6% 
None 104 .000% 2,027 60,749 9.1 11.78 86.8% 51.4% 
All 474 .639% 2,065 48,982 9.8 10.70 86.0% 48.7% 
POUs Up. 108 1.550% 2,221 51,908 10.2 11.37 86.7% 52.4% 
Mid. 118 .648% 2,554 44,607 10.3 10.01 86.0% 49.3% 
Low. 117 .251% 1,371 25,627 10.0 10.29 84.3% 45.9% 
None 103 .000% 2,113 60,552 10.0 11.79 86.9% 51.8% 
All 446 .613% 1,896 40,915 10.1 10.83 85.9% 49.7% 
IA/  
POUs 
Up. 74 1.703% 1,488 28,383 10.0 12.78 86.4% 54.0% 
Mid. 40 .693% 999 21,590 10.0 11.92 83.8% 49.3% 
Low. 56 .215% 798 12,800 10.0 10.84 83.2% 53.5% 
None 7 .000% 486 6,180 10.0 9.78 86.8% 50.2% 
All 177 .967% 965 16,872 10.0 11.85 84.9% 52.6% 
IN/ 
POUs 
Up. 1 1.221% 13,108 279,494 10.0 13.64 92.7% 59.3% 
Mid. 9 .574% 19,180 374,586 10.0 15.54 96.2% 71.9% 
Low. 7 .317% 14,412 439,328 10.0 15.62 93.2% 52.6% 
None 96 .000% 2,470 66,627 10.0 11.94 86.9% 51.5% 
All 113 .076% 3,560 94,786 10.0 12.47 88.0% 52.3% 
MI/ 
POUs 
Up. 18 1.163% 8,627 148,810 11.1 7.42 87.7% 47.9% 
Mid. 28 .682% 4,001 66,307 10.7 7.23 84.4% 39.6% 
Low. 4 .158% 1,325 20,479 10.0 5.96 85.5% 28.2% 
None 0        
All 50 .813% 4,478 77,545 10.8 7.20 85.7% 41.7% 
WI/ 
POUs 
Up. 15 1.279% 4,255 96,479 10.0 9.02 86.7% 45.9% 
Mid. 41 .597% 2,401 43,630 10.5 8.83 86.0% 51.0% 
Low. 50 .290% 2,634 72,906 10.0 9.27 84.3% 37.8% 
None 0        
All 106 .549% 2,739 63,735 10.2 9.06 86.0% 44.1% 
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Table 4.7: Cross-tabulation of Dependent Variable with State and 
Ownership Variables II 
Data
set 
Tier
s N 
Spendi
ng/rev
enue 
% 
Obama 
Voter
s 
Mean HH 
Inc. 
% 
Bach 
or 
Highe
r 
% 
Owner 
Occup
ied 
% 
Singl
e 
Famil
y 
% 
Mobil
e 
Home 
Over
all 
Up. 123 1.560% 49.5% $58,325 22.9% 77.7% 80.9% 5.0% 
Mid. 123 .654% 51.7% $56,452 21.3% 76.5% 77.5% 5.5% 
Low. 124 .245% 53.2% $58,271 22.6% 77.4% 79.9% 5.6% 
None 104 .000% 43.6% $59,290 19.9% 78.6% 80.9% 8.0% 
All 474 .639% 49.8% $58,037 21.7% 77.5% 79.7% 5.9% 
POUs Up. 108 1.550% 48.9% $60,271 21.4% 83.3% 87.5% 6.7% 
Mid. 118 .648% 50.4% $58,933 18.7% 84.0% 85.7% 9.2% 
Low. 117 .251% 51.8% $63,713 21.6% 84.5% 85.7% 10.0% 
None 103 .000% 42.8% $67,525 19.5% 85.3% 86.7% 9.0% 
All 446 .613% 48.5% $62,123 20.4% 84.1% 86.5% 8.4% 
IA/  
POUs 
Up. 74 1.703% 47.8% $58,617 22.3% 79.0% 85.9% 4.0% 
Mid. 40 .693% 47.4% $57,238 20.4% 79.1% 83.8% 3.9% 
Low. 56 .215% 51.7% $57,405 24.2% 78.6% 85.3% 3.5% 
None 7 .000% 48.3% $67,261 23.2% 80.8% 84.3% 4.1% 
All 177 .967% 48.9% $58,264 22.5% 79.0% 85.1% 3.8% 
IN/ 
POUs 
Up. 1 1.221% 47.3% $61,999 22.9% 90.1% 84.1% 14.6% 
Mid. 9 .574% 42.0% $62,703 20.7% 85.7% 83.8% 12.9% 
Low. 7 .317% 43.0% $65,797 20.8% 86.7% 78.2% 11.3% 
None 96 .000% 43.2% $58,645 19.7% 78.3% 80.6% 8.3% 
All 113 .076% 43.1% $59,441 19.9% 79.5% 81.1% 8.8% 
MI/ 
POUs 
Up. 18 1.163% 52.3% $52,334 22.1% 76.7% 74.6% 7.9% 
Mid. 28 .682% 49.8% $50,825 21.7% 67.8% 68.8% 3.9% 
Low. 4 .158% 49.8% $51,789 13.5% 74.4% 77.6% 9.2% 
None 0        
All 50 .813% 50.7% $51,445 21.2% 71.6% 71.6% 5.7% 
WI/ 
POUs 
Up. 15 1.279% 50.5% $64,504 25.5% 73.6% 70.7% 4.4% 
Mid. 41 .597% 58.1% $58,212 21.6% 78.3% 76.8% 6.3% 
Low. 50 .290% 56.6% $58,683 21.4% 75.8% 74.3% 7.1% 
None 0        
All 106 .549% 56.3% $59,324 22.1% 76.4% 74.8% 6.4% 
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Table 4.8: Cross-tabulation of Dependent Variable with State and 
Ownership Variables III 
Datas
et 
Tier
s N 
Spendi
ng/rev
enue 
% 
Houses 
1939 
% 
Houses 
1980 
% Gas 
Heat 
% LPG 
(Prop
ane) 
% 
Elect
ric 
Heat 
% 
Wood 
Heat 
Overa
ll 
Up. 123 1.560% 31.7% 27.1% 51.2% 24.7% 14.8% 4.5% 
Mid. 123 .654% 30.7% 28.2% 57.2% 18.2% 13.9% 5.4% 
Low. 124 .245% 31.5% 27.5% 53.3% 21.5% 13.3% 6.0% 
None 104 .000% 28.4% 31.5% 54.2% 19.0% 19.2% 3.4% 
All 474 .639% 30.7% 28.4% 54.0% 20.9% 15.1% 4.9% 
POUs Up. 108 1.550% 33.0% 26.3% 49.9% 25.8% 15.5% 4.2% 
Mid. 118 .648% 31.1% 27.9% 57.8% 17.7% 13.9% 5.1% 
Low. 117 .251% 32.3% 27.1% 52.6% 22.3% 13.0% 6.1% 
None 103 .000% 28.3% 31.4% 53.9% 19.0% 19.4% 3.4% 
All 446 .613% 31.2% 28.1% 53.6% 21.2% 15.3% 4.8% 
IA/  
POUs 
Up. 74 1.703% 37.6% 21.8% 45.8% 29.7% 17.8% 2.9% 
Mid. 40 .693% 37.8% 20.4% 57.7% 21.2% 15.3% 2.6% 
Low. 56 .215% 38.4% 19.2% 56.4% 24.2% 12.8% 2.5% 
None 7 .000% 32.6% 27.8% 54.1% 30.9% 11.1% 0.6% 
All 177 .967% 37.7% 21.1% 52.2% 26.1% 15.4% 2.6% 
IN/ 
POUs 
Up. 1 1.221% 13.6% 49.1% 26.5% 35.9% 24.8% 11.5% 
Mid. 9 .574% 19.7% 41.9% 21.3% 27.7% 37.3% 8.0% 
Low. 7 .317% 20.1% 41.1% 28.0% 27.8% 28.9% 8.3% 
None 96 .000% 28.0% 31.7% 53.9% 18.2% 19.9% 3.6% 
All 113 .076% 26.4% 33.3% 50.3% 19.0% 22.0% 4.2% 
MI/ 
POUs 
Up. 18 1.163% 25.2% 30.2% 61.2% 17.2% 7.6% 7.8% 
Mid. 28 .682% 32.4% 23.7% 79.5% 4.9% 9.1% 2.3% 
Low. 4 .158% 27.5% 23.2% 72.3% 12.2% 4.9% 7.1% 
None 0        
All 50 .813% 29.4% 26.0% 72.5% 9.9% 8.2% 4.6% 
WI/ 
POUs 
Up. 15 1.279% 21.0% 40.7% 58.0% 16.3% 12.8% 6.0% 
Mid. 41 .597% 26.1% 34.9% 51.2% 20.8% 10.8% 8.9% 
Low. 50 .290% 27.5% 34.4% 50.1% 20.1% 11.6% 9.8% 
None 0        
All 106 .549% 26.1% 35.5% 51.6% 19.8% 11.5% 8.9% 
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4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
4.2.1 Regression Methodology and Model Creation 
Through a preliminary data analysis of 18 potential 
independent variables, I chose five to combine with state dummy 
variables to construct a predictive model for energy efficiency 
program funding as a percentage of total revenue.  This is Model 
1.  I then add ownership dummy variables to Model 1 in order to 
create Model 2.  Table 4.9 shows what variables are in each 
model.  
Table 4.9: Regression Models and their Independent Variables 
Variable Type 
Applied to all 
states (entire 
dataset and POU 
data-subset) 
Applied to 
individual 
state/POU data-
subsets 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Total Sales Utility X X X X 
% Res Load Utility X X X X 
% Obama Political X X X X 
Income Economic X X X X 
% Elect Heat Heat X X X X 
Iowa State X X 
  Michigan State X X 
  Wisconsin State X X 
  IOU Ownership 
 
X* 
  Large MU Ownership 
 
X 
 
X 
REC Ownership 
 
X 
 
X 
 *Note: The IOU dummy variable in Model 2 is only included when model 
is applied to entire dataset.  It is not included when Model 2 is 
applied to the POU data-subset. 
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For the first part of the analysis I apply the two models 
to the overall dataset and then to just the POU data-subset.  
Model 1 allows me to look for the effects of the state variables 
as well any significant relationships between the dependent 
variable and the five independent variables when controlling for 
state effects.  Model 2 allows me to additionally evaluate for 
the influence of ownership type across all the states.  By 
applying Model 2 to both the overall dataset and the POU data-
subset I am able to get a better understanding of what the 
effects of ownership type are.  I am also able to see cases where 
independent variables might have come up significant in Model 1, 
but not in Model 2.  This might indicate that the variety of the 
dependent variables is better explained by ownership type than by 
the independent variable in question. 
The next part of the analysis is applying models to 
individual state data-subsets.  To create Model 3 I took Model 1 
and subtracted the state dummy variables leaving only the five 
independent variables (see Table 4.9).  Likewise Model 4 is 
simply Model 2 without the state dummy variables and without the 
IOU dummy variable.  In these two models, I am looking for 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables 
that are distinct to individual states.  While % Obama voters 
might be insignificant overall, it might be significant and 
positive in one state and significant and negative in another 
state.   
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Throughout these regressions, I analyze changes in 
significance, direction of relationship and the weight of 
coefficients. Both standardized and unstandardized beta 
coefficients are evaluated.  To get an idea of how much change an 
unstandardized coefficient contributes to the dependent variable, 
I apply the difference between the first and third quartiles of 
the independent variable’s data to the unstandardized 
coefficient.  This allows me weigh the respective predictive 
nature of significant independent variables.  Finally, I evaluate 
variables for significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels 
and each regression is tested for multi-collinearity through its 
tolerance value.     
The five variables included in all models are: total sales, 
% res load, % Obama voters, income and % elect heat.  These were 
chosen based on evaluation of the spending/revenue cross-
tabulations (Figures 4.6-4.8), preliminary regression analysis 
and a review of the literature.  Total sales, % res load and 
income have all been cited in a number of studies (Wilson, 2008, 
etc…) as common barriers to program development at small and 
publicly-owned utilities.  In early data analysis, total sales 
and % res load also appeared likely to exhibit a relationship 
with the dependent variable.  Because of the apparent correlation 
between electoral politics and energy efficiency funding at the 
state-level, I included % Obama voters in order to test the 
relationship at the county and utility level.  Since homes that 
heat with electricity are often the first target of energy 
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efficiency programs, I thought that the relative use of electric 
heat would be a strong predictor of program funding. 
In early analysis I applied Model 1 without state dummy 
variables to the overall dataset.  This resulted in very few if 
any significant independent variables and a low R-squared.  This 
helps show the controlling nature of state policy and other state 
factors and how little can be gained from a regression that 
doesn’t take states into account.  For this reason Model 1 is 
built with state dummy variables included.   
Because of Indiana’s numerous utilities without programs 
and little funding for those with programs, I choose to include 
the other three states, IA, MI and WI, as dummy variables in 
Model 1.  Likewise for the ownership dummies, I choose small MU 
as the constant to regress against because in early data analysis 
I found it to be the most different of the four ownership 
variables. 
 
4.2.2 Regression Results 
When Model 1 is applied to the overall dataset (Table 
4.10), the regression has an R-squared of 0.27 and all three 
state dummy variables are significant at 99%.  Michigan has a 
slightly greater coefficient than Iowa with Wisconsin not far 
behind both of them.  Controlling for state factors, total sales, 
% res load and % elect heat all show significant and positive 
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relationships.  State variables by far are the strongest 
predictors of the dependent variable.  Of the remaining 
independent variables % elect heat has the strongest 
relationship.  Not only does it have the highest standardized 
coefficient, but its unstandardized coefficient has the greatest 
effect.  If a utility’s % elect heat were to increase from the 
first to the third quartile of the dataset (from 9% to 20%) their 
predicted spending/revenue would increase by 0.18%.  This is 
substantial considering the median spending/revenue for all 
utilities is 0.47%.  While total sales and % res load are both 
significant, their effects are not as important, especially total 
sales.  Increasing from the first to the third quartiles of their 
respective data would net increases of 0.004% for total sales and 
.10% for % res load. 
Model 2 is listed in Table 4.10 as well.  Adding the 
ownership variables increases the R-squared from 0.27 to 0.31.  
State variables are still the most controlling in the model.  
Again both Michigan and Iowa have unstandardized coefficients 
over 1 with Iowa slightly higher now that ownership type is being 
controlled for.  The Wisconsin variable explains the dependent 
variable just about as well as it did when ownership was not 
included.  Of the three ownership dummies, IOU is significant at 
99% and REC significant at 90%.  Large MU is not significant.  
Aside from being more significant IOU has a stronger relationship 
with the dependent variable than REC.  Like the three state 
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variables included, all three ownership variables have positive 
relationships. 
Table 4.10: Regression Results with Models 1 & 2 within Overall Dataset 
Overall 
dataset Model 1 - Basic 
Model 2 - Basic w/Ownership 
dummies 
Variable 
Unstand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Stand.  
Coeffici
ent 
Toler
ance 
Value 
Unstand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Stand.  
Coeffici
ent 
Tolera
nce 
Value 
Total 
Sales 
2.302E-
08*** 0.113*** 0.943 7.869E-09 0.039 0.612 
% Res Load 0.003* 0.075* 0.909 0.002 0.069 0.699 
% Obama -0.005 -0.064 0.687 -0.006 -0.074 0.682 
Income 4.246E-06 0.065 0.927 3.376E-06 0.052 0.890 
% Elect 
Heat 0.016*** 0.193*** 0.676 0.016*** 0.192*** 0.673 
Iowa 1.026*** 0.703*** 0.543 1.059*** 0.725*** 0.527 
Michigan 1.074*** 0.497*** 0.539 1.048*** 0.485*** 0.536 
Wisconsin 0.779*** 0.476*** 0.429 0.777*** 0.474*** 0.426 
IOU       0.424*** 0.141*** 0.583 
Large MU       0.148 0.057 0.846 
REC       0.135* 0.082* 0.751 
  
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): -0.46 
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): -0.422 
  Adjusted R-Squared: 0.27 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.31 
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90% 
In the Model 2 regression within the overall dataset only % 
elect heat remains significant, still at 99%.  Both total sales 
and % res load are no longer significant.  With the same 
unstandardized coefficient as Model 1, % elect heat in Model 2 
predicts spending/revenue similarly.  The variability that is 
explained by total sales in Model 1 is likely better explained by 
IOU and that is why it drops from significance in Model 2. 
Models 1 and 2 are then applied to the POU data-subset 
(Table 4.11).  Since this research attempts to test and quantify 
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barriers to program development at POUs especially, it is helpful 
to look at how the same models perform with IOUs excluded from 
the data. 
Table 4.11: Regression Results with Models 1 & 2 within POU Data-subset 
POU data-
subset Model 1 – Basic 
Model 2 - Basic w/Ownership 
dummies 
Variable 
Unstand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Stand.  
Coeffici
ent 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Unstand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Stand.  
Coeffici
ent 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Total 
Sales 2.403E-07 0.070 0.829 6.914E-08 0.020 0.520 
% Res Load 0.003** 0.089** 0.880 0.002 0.058 0.639 
% Obama -0.005785 -0.075 0.687 -0.006 -0.072 0.685 
Income 3.887E-06 0.062 0.890 3.542E-06 0.056 0.883 
% Elect 
Heat 0.015*** 0.186*** 0.673 0.015*** 0.188*** 0.669 
Iowa 1.025*** 0.717*** 0.530 1.030*** 0.720*** 0.527 
Michigan 1.043*** 0.471*** 0.564 1.041*** 0.470*** 0.564 
Wisconsin 0.751*** 0.457*** 0.434 0.745*** 0.453*** 0.433 
Large MU       0.1083085 0.043 0.646 
REC       0.126 0.079 0.568 
  
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): -0.44 
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): -0.40 
  Adjusted R-Squared: 0.29 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.30 
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90% 
When I apply Model 1 to the POU data-subset I get an R-
squared of 0.29, very similar to the 0.27 when Model 1 is applied 
to the overall dataset.  All three state variables are again 
significant at 99% and have positive coefficients very close to 
the entire dataset regression.  The independent variable % elect 
heat has a slightly smaller coefficient, still strongly 
predictive though.  While total sales is not significant like it 
is when Model 1 in regressed in the overall dataset, % res load 
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has the same coefficient and is now significant at 95% rather 
than 90%. 
When I apply Model 2 to the POU data-subset, the IOU dummy 
variable is naturally removed from the model.  This leaves just 
Large MU and REC in Model 2 along with the five independent 
variables and three state variables.  While this regression 
increases the R-squared by a percentage point to 0.30, neither of 
the ownership variables are significant and % res load is no 
longer significant.  Otherwise the three state variables and % 
elect heat all have similar coefficients to their results in the 
other three regressions in Tables 4.10 and 4.11.  
Following the analysis of the independent variables 
controlling for state factors, I apply models to each state/POU 
data-subset.  For the same reason I created Model 2, (in order to 
evaluate potential barriers to program development specifically 
at POUs), I found it necessary to remove IOUs from this level of 
analysis by creating a POU-only data-subset for each state.  IOUs 
also number quite few in each state which makes their inclusion 
as a dummy variable difficult. 
For each state I apply two models.  Model 3 consists of the 
five basic independent variables: total sales, % res load, % 
Obama voters, income, and % elect heat.  Model 4 consists of the 
five independent variables plus two ownership variables: large MU 
and REC. 
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Table 4.12: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Iowa/POU data-
subset 
Iowa/POU 
data-subset Model 3 - State Basic 
Model 4 - State Basic 
w/Ownership dummies 
Variable 
Unstand.  
Coefficien
t 
Stand.  
Coeffic
ient 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Unstand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Stand.  
Coeffic
ient 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Total Sales 1.005E-06* 0.141* .823 9.920E-07 .139 .343 
% Res Load .006 .127 .839 .006 .115 .660 
% Obama -0.008 -0.079 .840 -0.008 -0.075 .829 
Income 5.080E-06 .055 .932 4.915E-06 .053 .929 
% Elect 
Heat 
0.024** 0.207** .836 0.024** 0.206** .833 
Large MU       -.146 -.021 .510 
REC       .058 .028 .560 
  
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): 0.26 
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): 0.27 
  Adjusted R-Squared: 0.08 
Adjusted R-
Squared: 0.09 
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90% 
When Model 3 is applied to the Iowa/POU data-subset (Table 
4.12), both total sales and % elect heat come up significant.  
Unlike the Model 1 regression in the overall dataset, total sales 
in the Iowa/POU data-subset shows a relationship that is not only 
significant, but also has a stronger coefficient.  A utility that 
increased in size from the first quartile to the third (a gain of 
55,718 kWh worth of sales) would increase spending/revenue by 
0.06%.  Like regressions in Models 1 and 2, % elect heat shows a 
positive relationship with a coefficient of 0.024.  A first to 
third quartile increase in homes heated with electricity would 
increase program spending/revenue in Iowa by 0.24%, a sizable 
amount considering the median spending/revenue for Iowa POUs is 
only 0.75%.   
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Model 4 evaluates whether controlling for the type of POU 
within each state adds variation and clarity to the model.  In 
Iowa, only % elect heat is significant in Model 4.  Neither large 
MU or REC is significant.  Not only is total sales no longer 
significant, but its tolerance score is below 0.4.  The R-squared 
for each of Models 3 or 4 is below 0.10. 
Table 4.13: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Indiana/POU data-
subset 
Ind/POU 
data-
subset 
Model 3 - State Basic 
Model 4 - State Basic 
w/Ownership dummies 
Variable 
Unstand.  
Coefficient 
Stand.  
Coeffici
ent 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Unstand.  
Coefficien
t 
Stand.  
Coeffici
ent 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Total 
Sales 
3.011E-07*** 0.319*** .758 1.406E-07 .149 .375 
% Res 
Load 
.003*** 0.278*** .830 .001 .146 .696 
% Obama 0.003 0.090 .901 0.003 0.099 .879 
Income -4.851E-07 -.029 .785 -1.298E-06 -.078 .746 
% Elect 
Heat 
0.008*** 0.373*** .870 0.008*** 0.365*** .813 
Large MU       -.004 -.007 .535 
REC       0.148*** 0.350*** .475 
  
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): -0.39 
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): -0.30 
  Adjusted R-Squared: 0.34 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.42 
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90% 
Within this data, Indiana (Table 4.13) is really defined by 
a sizable portion of utilities within the state without EE 
programs.  Less than half of the RECs and no MUs operated 
programs in 2010. When Model 3 is applied to the Indiana/POU 
data-subset, total sales, % res load and % elect heat are all 
significant and positive.  In Model 4 both % elect heat and REC 
are highly significant and positive.  Considering that RECs are 
the only utilities without zeros for the dependent variable this 
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makes sense.  The highly significant % elect heat could help 
explain why those RECs voluntarily choose to establish an EE 
program. 
Table 4.14: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Michigan/POU data-
subset 
Mich/POU 
data-subset Model 3 - State Basic 
Model 4 - State Basic 
w/Ownership dummies 
Variable 
Unstand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Stand.  
Coeffi
cient 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Unstand.  
Coefficien
t 
Stand.  
Coeffic
ient 
Toler
ance 
Level 
Total Sales 1.042E-07 .118 .943 -6.310E-08 -.072 .673 
% Res Load .003 .221 .884 -.001 -.052 .431 
% Obama 0.013* 0.262* .980 0.014** 0.287** .942 
Income 2.020E-06 .056 .933 -9.574E-07 -.027 .868 
% Elect 
Heat 
.005 .057 .864 .006 .070 .859 
Large MU       .130 .165 .711 
REC       0.388** 0.464** .406 
  
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): -0.14 
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): 0.05 
  
Adjusted R-
Squared: 0.14 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.23 
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90% 
Michigan’s R-squared for Models 3 and 4 are 0.14 and 0.23 
respectively (Table 4.14).  In Model 3 only % Obama voters is 
significant and it is positive.  It has a coefficient of 0.013 
which means that if a Michigan POU’s electoral support for 
President Obama grew from the first quartile to the third (47% to 
54%), spending/revenue would increase by 0.09%.  For perspective, 
the median spending/revenue for Michigan POUs is 0.76%.  With the 
inclusion of POU ownership variables in Model 4, both the 
significance and strength of coefficient of % Obama voters 
increase very slightly.  Also REC is significant at 95% and 
positive at 0.388.  As the box plot suggests above (Figure 4.1), 
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RECs in Michigan do appear to have greater spending/revenue 
percentages than MUs.  Model 4 shows that even when controlling 
for the independent variables in the model, RECs still spend 
more. 
In preliminary data analysis Wisconsin often seemed to have 
more independent variables come up significant than any other 
state.  When Models 3 and 4 are applied to the Wisconsin/POU 
data-subset, three variables come up significant for Model 3 and 
four come up for Model 4.  In Model 3, % Obama voters is negative 
and significant at 99%.  Both % elect heat and income are 
significant (95% and 99% respectively) and positive.  While % 
elect heat has consistently come up significant in a variety of 
regressions, this is the first time that income has come up 
significant.  As the mean income of a utility’s service grows 
from the first to third quartile of data (from $51,531 to 
$64,451), spending/revenue would rise by 0.11%.  This is 
equivalent to the first to third quartile rise in % elect heat.  
These are significant increases considering the median 
spending/revenue for Wisconsin POUs in 2010 was 0.44%.   
Yet more influential in this model than either of those two 
variables is % Obama voters. Unlike what was proposed in the 
hypothesis (or as is indicated in Michigan), % Obama voters shows 
a negative relationship in Wisconsin POUs when controlling for 
the independent variables.  A first to third quartile increase in 
% Obama voters would increase spending/revenue by 0.14%.   
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Table 4.15: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Wisconsin/POU data-
subset 
Wisc/POU 
data-subset Model 3 - State Basic 
Model 4 - State Basic 
w/Ownership dummies 
Variable 
Unstand.  
Coefficien
t 
Stand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Tole
ranc
e 
Leve
l 
Unstand.  
Coefficien
t 
Stand.  
Coefficie
nt 
Tole
ranc
e 
Leve
l 
Total Sales -2.290E-07 -.078 .931 -2.103E-07 -.071 .356 
% Res Load .003 .151 .840 0.005* 0.308* .278 
% Obama -0.015*** -0.312*** .971 -0.016*** -0.316*** .969 
Income 
8.807E-
06*** 
0.278*** .929 8.046E-
06*** 
0.254*** .899 
% Elect 
Heat 
0.015** 0.215** .863 0.014** 0.208** .860 
Large MU       -.156 -.175 .243 
REC       .107 .088 .447 
  
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant):  0.63 
Beta Coefficient 
(Constant): 0.60 
  Adjusted R-Squared: 0.19 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.21 
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90% 
Model 4 in the Wisconsin/POU data-subset shows the same 
significant variables as Model 3 except that % res load is also 
significant.  While variable’s coefficient is large, its 
tolerance value is quite low at 0.278.  Likewise total sales and 
large MU both have low tolerance values.  With such low levels it 
is best not to trust the results of the Model 4 regression in the 
Wisconsin/POU data-subset. 
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4.2.3 Independent Variable Findings 
Table 4.16: Found Relationships of Independent Variables to Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable Type 
Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Found 
Relationship 
Total Sales Utility Positive Positive 
% Res Load Utility Negative Positive 
% Obama Voters Political Positive Positive/Negative 
Income Housing Positive Positive 
% Elect Heat Heat Positive Positive 
Michigan State Positive Positive 
Iowa State Positive Positive 
Wisconsin State Positive Positive 
Indiana State Negative Negative 
REC Ownership Negative Positive 
Small MU Ownership Negative Negative 
Large MU Ownership Negative Undetermined 
IOU Ownership Positive Positive 
 
State – The state variable was found to be the most 
predictive of any factor.  Regardless of whether ownership 
variables are included or whether IOUs are excluded from the data 
being regressed, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin hold consistent 
coefficients.  Even the coefficient for Wisconsin, the weakest of 
the states, is greater than the strongest independent variable, % 
elect heat, or any of the ownership dummy variables. When 
ownership variables are not controlled for (and the five 
independent variables are), Michigan is slightly stronger.  When 
ownership dummy variables are included, Iowa is slightly 
stronger.   
Ownership – When Model 2 is applied to the overall dataset, 
IOUs come up as the strongest in terms of program funding.  While 
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RECs are found to have a positive effect as well, it is much less 
than IOUs when controlling for states and the five independent 
variables.  When IOUs are excluded from the data, RECs indicate a 
positive relationship to EE spending in Michigan and Indiana. 
However when Model 2 is applied to the POU dataset, RECs do not 
come up significant.  This suggests there’s not strong variation 
between MUs and RECs across all four states.  Large MUs never 
show a significant relationship.  It’s likely that there’s not 
enough variability between large and small MUs. 
Total sales – When Model 1 is applied to the overall 
dataset, total sales has a positive and significant relationship 
with spending/revenue.  Yet when ownership type is controlled 
for, total sales is no longer significant.  This suggests that 
the size of the utility does matter in many cases; but size has 
more to do with IOUs generally being larger than POUs.  When IOUs 
are excluded from data (as when Model is applied to the POU data-
subset), total sales is not significant.  However within Iowa and 
Indiana POUs total sales is significant and positive. 
% res load – While % res load is significant and positive 
in Model 1 regressions it is insignificant in Model 2 when 
ownership type is controlled for.  These are the results both in 
the overall dataset and within just the POUs.  Initially this 
finding of a positive relationship seems at odds with earlier 
studies that cited a large residential load as a barrier to 
energy efficiency program development.  Yet, it’s likely that the 
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seemingly positive relationship is more a result of much higher 
residential loads at RECs than small MUs (65% to 46%) than a 
positive relationship independent of ownership type.  RECs have 
shown to have greater spending/revenue than small MUs and when 
ownership is controlled for, % res load is no longer significant.  
Within states, % res load only came up significant in Indiana and 
again it’s likely due to some RECs spending on programs and no 
MUs spending on programs. 
% Obama voters – Because of the apparent correlation 
between state-level funding for energy efficiency and how likely 
states vote for the Democratic candidate in presidential 
elections, it was presumed that the relationship would continue 
to be positive at the county and utility-level.  Models 3 and 4 
suggest this to be the case in Michigan.   % Obama voters is the 
only significant variable in both regressions.  In Wisconsin 
however, the variable has a negative sign.  Of the three 
independent variables that are significant, % Obama voters is the 
strongest predictor in Wisconsin.  Often in spatial analysis an 
electoral variable becomes a proxy for a measure of how rural an 
area is.  Liberals live in cities and conservatives live in the 
country.  Yet, Michigan and Wisconsin have more political 
diversity in rural areas than most states do.  In Wisconsin for 
example, some of the most politically conservative areas of the 
state are in the wealthy suburbs around Milwaukee.  It’s possible 
that the negative sign on % Obama voters in Wisconsin is a proxy 
for the rural/urban divide, but that the politics are switched. 
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 Income – While low incomes has often been cited as a 
barrier to energy efficiency at RECs and small MUs, the only 
relationship I find between an area’s income level and program 
funding is in Wisconsin.  Here it has a positive relationship, 
which means the wealthier an area is, the greater its utility 
provider invests in energy efficiency.  In their study of EE 
programs at Minnesota POUs, Wilson (2008) found low incomes to be 
a barrier to program development.  This finding of a positive 
relationship in Wisconsin (the state adjacent to Minnesota) 
supports that. 
 % Elect Heat – This variable is another that could be 
hypothesized in either direction.  Logically, it makes the most 
sense for % elect heat to have a positive relationship.  
Historically, heating with electricity has been terribly 
inefficient and therefore electrically-heated homes are usually 
one of the first targets by energy efficiency programs.  So a 
utility with a higher percent of electrically-heated homes in its 
area should have more reason to fund a program.  This variable 
continually comes up significant and positive.  It is significant 
in the both the overall and POU datasets, regardless whether I am 
controlling for just states or ownership type as well.  It also 
is positive in the state/POU data-subsets for Iowa, Indiana and 
Wisconsin.  Only in Michigan did it come up insignificant.  Also 
it is often the strongest predictor of the dependent variable for 
any of the five independent variables.   
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4.3 Overall Findings 
1) In 2010, energy efficiency programs were nearly universal 
across Iowa, Wisconsin and Michigan.  By 2012, program 
coverage in Indiana was substantial. 
Of the 336 utilities in those states, only 8 did not operate a 
program in 2010.  Of the 178 utilities in Iowa that are asked to 
develop programs though not held to minimum standards, only 8 
claimed some sort of exception and did not develop a program.  
All of the programs in Indiana in 2010 were created voluntarily 
since their EERS didn’t go into effect until 2011. Although 
outside of the state’s EERS jurisdiction, the majority POUs in 
Indiana began operating programs in 2012.  Coverage there now is 
much more widespread, likely between 80% and 90%. 
2) The state a utility is in is by far the most controlling 
factor. 
This is due to state policy, regulatory authority and whether 
there’s a history and/or culture of energy efficiency and 
conservation.  While all four states had enacted EERS by 2010, 
Michigan’s policies were implemented in 2009, Iowa in 201 and 
Wisconsin and Indiana in 2011.  Iowa has set relatively high 
standards for IOUs, while instructing POUs to operate programs 
but excluding them from minimum standards.  Michigan’s standard 
is less than Iowa’s but applied to all utilities, IOUs and POUs 
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alike.  Wisconsin requires IOUs to contribute to a common 
program; POUs either contribute to the common program, operate 
independent program, or a mix of the two.  Indiana requires all 
jurisdictional utilities to reach an energy savings standard 
similar to Michigan’s.  Jurisdictional utilities include all IOUs 
and the roughly 10% of POUs which haven’t opted out of 
jurisdiction.   
Within these basic frameworks of policy and regulation, the 
state’s history and culture really help drive how much utilities 
invest in energy efficiency.  Utilities in Iowa and Wisconsin 
have consistently operated energy efficiency programs since the 
1980s.  Before a lull from 1996 to 2008, Michigan had a strong 
history of energy efficiency programs in the state.  These 
histories helped drive energy efficiency irrespective of the 
EERS.  While Indiana was one of the first states in this group to 
pass an EERS, their energy efficiency program didn’t start until 
2011 with some utilities not starting until 2012.  Looking back 
to Figure 3.1, one can see that Michigan and Indiana were ranked 
similarly before they each passed an EERS.  Even though the 
standards are not that dissimilar, by 2012 Michigan had become on 
par with Iowa and Wisconsin, while Indiana still languished far 
behind.  This is likely due to the history Michigan and their 
utilities had in utilizing energy efficiency, as well as popular 
support rooted in history of conservation.   
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While this idea has been studied and presented many times, 
very few studies have explored a state’s influence at the utility 
level.  Through examination of means, medians, standard 
deviations and regression analysis, it clear that the state a 
utility is in greatly influences energy efficiency program 
spending.  In 2010, the average utility in Iowa or Michigan spent 
the most (between 0.95% and 0.75% of total revenue), followed by 
Wisconsin (between 0.60% and 0.47%) and then Indiana (less the 
0.08%).   
Reprint of Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue, 
Specific to State Data-subsets 
State N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Iowa 180 0.95% 0.75% 0.91% 
Indiana 118 0.08% 0.00% 0.20% 
Michigan 58 0.85% 0.85% 0.35% 
Wisconsin 118 0.60% 0.47% 0.40% 
All 474 0.63% 0.47% 0.71% 
 
Of the three states with widespread program coverage in 2010, 
only Michigan set a minimum standard for their POUs. Iowa did not 
and Wisconsin’s standard would not begin until 2011. While Iowa 
had many small utilities with low spending/revenue data, they 
also had many utilities with some of the highest percentages in 
the dataset.  This can be seen in the high standard deviation, 
almost three times Michigan’s.  Because Michigan sets clearer 
standards for its POUs, does that lead to their funding levels 
being grouped more closely together?  Conversely, could Iowa’s 
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greater freedom with their POUs in setting program goals lead to 
a wider dispersion of success?   
 
3) While investor-owned utilities spend more on their energy 
efficiency programs as a percent of their total revenue 
than do municipal utilities or rural electric cooperatives, 
small municipal utilities spend considerably less on 
average than large MUs or RECs. 
In 2010, IOUs in these four states invested almost 1% of their 
total revenue in energy efficiency (Table 4.3).  They were 
followed by RECs, large MUs and finally small MUs.  Small MUs, 
while they spend the least on average are a diverse group when it 
comes to funding levels with 14 of the top 16 utilities in the 
overall dataset being small MUs.  Their lower levels of funding 
are also evidenced through the regression model.  In Model 2, 
small MUs are the constant that the other ownership dummy 
variables are being regressed against.  Both RECs and IOUs show 
significant and positive relationships when controlling for state 
factors and the five independent variables.   
Reprint of Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue, 
Specific to Ownership Type Data-subsets 
Ownership N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
IOU 28 0.97% 0.94% 0.77% 
Large MU 38 0.55% 0.58% 0.48% 
Small MU 292 0.59% 0.38% 0.77% 
REC 116 0.68% 0.55% 0.57% 
All 474 0.64% 0.47% 0.71% 
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4) The bigger a utility is, the more it invests in its energy 
efficiency program. 
Through descriptive statistics and regression analysis, total 
sales (kWh) continually showed a positive relationship with 
spending/revenue.  Yet it is difficult disentangle size from 
ownership type, especially when there’s very large amounts of 
spending at very large IOUs.  Within only POUs, size did show 
positive relationships in Indiana and Iowa. 
5) The percent of a utility’s total electrical load that’s 
residential potentially has a positive relationship with 
spending/revenue. 
Often cited as one of the common barriers to energy efficiency at 
rural utilities, especially among RECs and MUs, this paper finds 
that % res load and spending/revenue potentially have a positive 
relationship.  First, in a comparison of means (Table 4.6) and 
within regression Model 1, % res load suggests a positive 
relationship.  While it’s possible this is the case, it more 
likely that the relationship is better explain by RECs spending 
more than small MUs.  And that RECs have a much greater share of 
residential load than small MUs.  Because when ownership types 
are controlled for % res load is no longer significant. 
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6) As a general rule, a liberal political persuasion at the 
local level does not increase investments in energy 
efficiency programs. 
While the % Obama voters does show a positive relationship when 
the regression model is applied to Michigan, it also shows a 
negative relationship when Model 3 is applied to the Wisconsin 
data-subset.  Neither in the overall dataset nor the POU dataset, 
does % Obama voters reach a level of significance.  This is the 
case when controlling for state and ownership effects.  Since the 
state capitol is where much of the energy efficiency policy takes 
place, the political make-up of the legislature may be a better 
predictor of energy efficiency than the political make-up of the 
population.  
7) Areas with larger shares of houses heated with electricity, 
invest more in energy efficiency programs. 
This finding supports the idea that energy efficiency 
programs target homes that are electrically-heated.  It makes 
sense that utilities that serve communities with higher shares of 
electrically-heated homes would be more interested in pursuing 
energy efficiency and delivering program services.  The variable 
was found to be significant and positive both in the overall and 
POU datasets, as well as in Iowa, Indiana and Wisconsin. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 One of the goals of this research was to evaluate how 
ownership type at an electric utility affected the development 
and operation of an energy efficiency program.  I had thought if 
I created a dataset of all the utilities within a sample of 
states, I could take the findings and apply them more broadly to 
MUs, RECs and IOUs all across the country.  By selecting four 
states that controlled for many factors (climate, culture, etc.), 
it was thought that state policy and regulation would be the main 
controlling factors; that states could be categorized as: no 
energy efficiency regulation, only regulation of IOUs, or 
regulation of all utilities. 
 But what I found was that even in a sample of four states I 
found a good deal of variety in state policy and regulation.  
Likewise I learned that there’s more to the state factor than 
just policy.  A state’s history of energy efficiency utilization 
and attitude towards conservation are likely factors as well.  
The state-level influence appears to not only be the strongest 
factor in energy efficiency program funding, but also something 
extremely distinct to each state. 
 Many of the findings likely would apply to nearby states in 
the Midwest, but that applicability grows thin as one moves to 
other regions of the country.  For one, the disparity in wealth 
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between rural and metro areas in the Midwest is not as stark as 
it is in the South.  While this study didn’t find that income 
level was a reliable predictor of energy efficiency spending 
(outside of Wisconsin), in other regions with a poorer rural 
population that might not be the case.   
 While I made all reasonable attempts to create a uniform 
dataset, it is far from perfect.  Each state utilizes different 
systems and templates that utilities use to submit energy 
efficiency program data.  Even within states numerous forms and 
procedures exist for utilities of different ownership types and 
size.  Sometime spending data is simply one line item in a larger 
budget, sometimes the entire report is about energy efficiency 
and I had to add up individual line items.  Any future attempts 
to create a dataset of EE program spending or energy savings 
should take these cautions into account.   
 Likewise, the method of attaching socio-demographic and 
economic variables to utility service areas was far from perfect.  
In other areas of the country where there’s more uniformity in a 
utility provider across a town or county, attaching variables 
would be a smoother process.  Yet the states in this study have 
extremely complicated service areas that simply do not match any 
geographic designation of the census bureau. 
As part of the research process, I intentionally set the 
issue of scale aside in order to focus on small and very small 
publicly-owned utilities.  Yet if the greater goal is to reduce 
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energy use, it makes sense that policymakers focus first on the 
largest utilities.  To help put this thesis in perspective, it’s 
necessary to address the issue of scale. 
In Iowa for example, the two large IOUs distribute 37 times 
as much energy as the smallest 100 utilities combined.  From a 
policy standpoint, does it make sense to spend time and resources 
on getting small utilities to start programs when the 
contribution of these utilities to total energy use is 
comparatively insignificant?  A modest program at a large utility 
can save more energy than many robust programs at small 
utilities.   
In this thesis I have normalized the size of utilities by 
their total revenue, but can energy efficiency programs at very 
large and very small utilities even be compared via a monetary 
normalization?  Is an investment of $40,000 by a utility with 
1,000 customers as relatively effective as an investment of $40 
million by a utility with one million customers? What about 
$4,000 for 100 customers?  At each of these vastly different 
scales, I briefly address what specific activities constitute an 
energy efficiency program? 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shed light on these questions.  Table 
5.1 presents five different scales of program spending in Iowa.  
First are the two IOUs who spend in the tens of millions of 
dollars, then the three highest spending POUs who spend in the 
hundreds of thousands, then three POUs in the tens of thousands, 
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then four MUs who spend just over 10,000, followed by three of 
the smallest programs in Iowa.  Table 5.1 also shows quick 
comparisons of program offerings, while Table 5.2 gives more 
detail about numbers of participants and total funding in 
specific program categories. 
Table 5.1: Scale and Types of Energy Efficiency Programs at Utilities 
in Iowa   
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MidAmerica
n Energy IOU 1 $42,252,259 3.63% 637,604 X X X X 
Interstate 
P&L IOU 2 $28,567,395 2.17% 483,196 X X X X 
Linn 
County REC REC 3 $922,204 2.16% 24,685 X X X X 
North West 
REC REC 4 $639,909 1.81% 9,477 X X X X 
Cedar 
Falls MU-L 5 $635,972 1.74% 17,911 X X X X 
Franklin 
REC REC 41 $78,729 1.50% 1,933 X X 
  
Clarke EC REC 42 $76,289 0.70% 5,229 X X 
  
Akron MU-S 45 $54,460 4.14% 836 X X 
  Farnhamvil
le MU-S 84 $13,035 3.38% 257 X X 
  
Alta MU-S 86 $12,694 0.93% 965 X X 
  Forest 
City MU-S 87 $12,055 0.23% 1,969 X X 
 
X 
Aurelia MU-S 88 $11,920 1.67% 521 X X 
  Pleasant 
Hill 
Community 
Line REC 169 $150 0.04% 103 
 
X 
  
Alta Vista MU-S 170 $143 0.08% 197 
    Marathon MU-S 172 $100 0.05% 223 X 
   Source: Energy efficiency program reports from Iowa PUB website 
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 Generally, the smaller programs tend to just offer lighting 
incentives (i.e. free CFLs) and rebates for new space 
heating/cooling systems, appliances and domestic hot water 
systems.  These rebates can be as low as $15 for a ventilation 
fan or as high as $6,500 for a heat pump.  Considering that lack 
of staff capacity is a common barrier to program development at 
small utilities, it makes sense that small utilities would focus 
their resources on less complicated programs like offering 
rebates.  
 As programs grow in size the variety grows as well. Both 
North West REC and Cedar Falls MU offer weatherization programs, 
as well as commercial/industrial programs.  Both of these types 
of programs, especially when they offer energy audits and/or 
financing options tend to be more complicated and can take more 
staff to manage.  Weatherization programs not only require 
knowledgeable staff at the utility, but also local and 
experienced energy efficiency contractors to carry out the work.  
Industrial, commercial and agricultural programs can require 
greater expertise as well.  While energy efficient lighting 
upgrades in a single family house are usually as simple as 
changing a light bulb, large stores, factories and other 
facilities can have more complicated systems that require more 
knowledge and skill in order to upgrade. 
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Table 5.2: Energy Efficiency Program Specifics and the Scale of 
Spending at Utilities in Iowa 
Utility 
Programs/Incentives Offered – Total participants served / 
type of program (total $ spent) – (RES: Residential, NON-RES: 
Non-Residential) 
MidAmeric
an Energy 
RES: 11,661 HVAC ($2.2 Mil), 1 Mil Lighting ($1.4 Mil), 
25,793 Energy Star Appliances ($1.2 Mil), 4,998 
Weatherization ($723,429), 6,091 New Construction ($2.1 
Mil), 45,276; NON-RES: 62,173 Lighting ($1.2 Mil), 2,038 
Custom Program ($1.1 Mil), 22,588 Small Commercial Program 
($1.2 Mil), 13,980 Energy Analysis Program ($3.2 Mil), 527 
Comm New Const ($5.9 Mil); also appliance recycling, 
agriculture, & multi-family programs 
Intersta
te P&L 
RES: Heating/cooling, appliance rebates ($8.1 Mil), Energy 
Audits/Weatherization ($1.3 Mil), Appliance Recycling ($1.6 
Mil); NON-RES: Heating/Cooling/Appliance Rebates ($4.5 Mil), 
Custom Program ($6.3 Mil), Comm New Const ($3.5 Mil) and 
Multi-family, New Home Const, Agriculture, and Performance 
Contracting Programs 
Linn 
County 
REC 
RES: 143 Geothermal HP ($299,140), 346 DHW ($79,588), 1,485 
Energy Star Appliances ($102,387), other lighting, 
heating/cooling, DHW 
North 
West REC 
RES 58 Geothermal HP ($160,727), 105 Air Source HP 
($91,169), 180 DHW ($63,008), 95 Weatherization ($44,081), 
other appliances, heating/cooling, lighting; NON-RES: 5 
custom industrial program ($162,384), other lighting, 
heating/cooling 
Cedar 
Falls 
Offers Energy Audits to houses at least 10 years old where 
CFLs, low-flow showerheads and other small measures are 
installed.  Aside from various heating/cooling and appliance 
rebates, the utility offers rebates on weatherization 
measures following the audit 
Franklin 
REC 
RES: 12 Geothermal HP ($18,280), 18 Air Source HP ($11,490), 
33 DHW ($13,605), other lighting, appliance, 
heating/cooling, DHW incentives,  
Clarke 
EC 
RES: 21 Geothermal Heat Pump ($30,892), 13 Air Source Heat 
Pump ($8,423), 3,218 Lighting ($5,471), other 
heating/cooling, DHW, Energy Star Appliances 
Akron 
RES: 9 Gas Furnace/Boiler Incentives ($45K), 17 Elect DHW 
heaters ($3,400), 3 new home construction ($6,000) 
Farnhamv
ille RES: 400 Lighting ($0), 2 Res Heat Pumps ($13,035) 
Alta 
RES: 702 Lighting Incentives ($1,953), 7 Res Heat Pumps 
($2,338), 1 Ventilation Fan ($15), 24 Electric DHW ($7,928) 
Forest 
City 
RES: 864 Lighting ($1,284), 40 Energy Star Appliances 
($2,863), 15 Appliance Recycling ($363), 16 Air Cond 
($1,600), 6 Vent. Fans ($60), NON-RES: 112 Lighting ($5,886) 
Aurelia 
RES: 440 Lighting ($1,320), 20 Energy Star Appliances 
($650), 1 Air Cond ($100), 5 Res Heat Pumps ($8,400), 8 
Electric DHW ($1,600) 
Pleasant 
Hill  CFL bulbs handed out to members who attended Annual Meeting 
Alta 
Vista 
Management costs for Low-Income program likely funded from 
different source? 
Marathon 2 Energy Star Appliances ($100) 
Source: Energy efficiency program reports from Iowa PUB website 
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 At the top of Table 5.1 are the two large IOUs in Iowa.  
While MidAmerican Energy and Interstate P&L distribute about 75% 
of the energy in the state, they account for 86% of the total 
spending on energy efficiency programs in the state.  Because 
they proportionally spend more than their smaller counterparts, 
it’s difficult to parse out how much of their increased program 
options are due to more relative spending or more absolute 
spending.  While the program offerings at the IOUs and large POUs 
may seem similar in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 shows the breadth and 
budgets of specific programs.  The IOUs do have more spending in 
common programs like rebates and lighting as would be expected.  
However these common programs that tend to dominate the portfolio 
of EE programs at small utilities tend to be a small percentage.  
Less than 15% of MidAmerican Energy’s total spending is on 
residential rebates and lighting.  The two RECs with the largest 
budgets, Linn County and North West, spend between 60% and 75% on 
residential rebates and lighting. And aside from Forest City MU 
(which offered a commercial lighting program), all the other POUs 
in Table 4.13 spent their entire budget on residential rebates 
and lighting. 
 One of the advantages of scale appears to be that EE 
programs can increase in variety as well as simply offer more of 
the same.  This short survey shows that small EE programs tend to 
only offer rebates and lighting upgrades.  For the small 
utilities who have larger spending as a % of revenue 
(Farnhamville and Akron), their relatively large spending is 
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simple due to offering larger incentives and allowing more 
participants.  Farnhamville’s entire EE program in 2010 was two 
residential heating pump rebates, in operation very similar to 
Marathon’s which also offered two rebates (for efficient 
appliances).  The difference was that Marathon’s rebate was worth 
$50 each, while Farnhamville offered over $6,500.  Likewise, 
Akron offered 9 furnace/boiler rebates each worth $5,000.  This 
encompassed 83% of their total budget. 
 As the program’s budget expands the program variety also 
expands.  Once programs reach budgets into the hundreds of 
thousands, they begin regularly incorporating weatherization and 
expanding incentives to commercial, industrial and agricultural 
customers. Looking at the large IOUs and their budgets in the 
tens of millions, the program variety expands even more.  Aside 
from offering the same package as the large RECs and MUs, the 
IOUs offer many other specialized programs that can target 
niches.  They can divide up their commercial program to serve 
large, small and new construction commercial all separately.  
MidAmerican Energy even has an Energy Analysis program which 
offers advanced energy audits to large commercial/industrial 
customers. 
 Aside from a similarly designed study that created a better 
dataset through a more defined and exhaustive collection of 
program data or more sophisticated calculation of the independent 
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variables, the best next steps for future research would be to 
explore these states in greater detail.   
Iowa, with its large number of utilities, robust programs 
and detailed reporting mechanisms offers a great laboratory to 
explore energy efficiency programs in more detail.  As the short 
survey above explained, it’s possible to get program spending and 
energy savings data for very specific efficiency measures.  It 
would be interesting to explore which types of measures help 
utilities most effectively reach their energy savings goals.    
Indiana is interesting because of the relatively strong EE 
program developed voluntarily by many of the RECs in 2009.  
Additionally, almost all of the RECs and most of the MUs 
voluntarily joined Energizing Indiana, the state-branded program 
in 2012.  Since Hoosier Energy (the cooperative of 17 RECs with 
an EE program in 2009), started their energy efficiency program 
independent of state policy, it would be interesting to find out 
how joining the state program, Energizing Indiana, has affected 
their program.   
While Michigan does have savings minimums and spending caps 
on all its utilities which constrict variability, they do exhibit 
an interesting mix of program management options.  There are 
three common programs in Michigan and a number of utilities who 
operate independent programs.  Since Michigan’s utilities are 
split somewhat evenly between the four options, it would be 
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interesting to explore the relative success of each program 
versus the utilities that operate programs independently. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 The thing that stands out most in this study is the quickly 
evolving nature of the energy efficiency industry.  This research 
evaluated the year 2010.  If one were to apply the same method to 
2012 data spending/revenue results would likely be greater; 2008 
data on the other hand, the results would likely much less. 
 Indiana is probably the best example of this.  For a long 
time the state has been in the lower tiers of states when it 
comes to energy efficiency.  While it took a year or two longer 
than expected to get fully operation, their common program 
Energizing Indiana now has a substantial membership among POUs.  
Even though they’re exempted from the minimum standards set forth 
in the state’s EERS, nearly every REC and most MUs have joined 
the state program anyway.  These voluntary actions towards energy 
efficiency by the state’s POUs even precede the state’s EERS and 
Energizing Indiana.  In 2009, Hoosier Energy, a G&T Cooperative 
made up of 17 RECs, created an energy efficiency program of their 
own.  While the voluntary programs at the state’s IOUs spent an 
average of 0.12% of their total revenue on energy efficiency 
programs, the average for the 17 RECs was 0.51%, over four times 
as much. 
 This is similar to Iowa where even though POUs are exempted 
from the minimum standards, over 90% of them developed energy 
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efficiency programs; with some of them investing a higher 
percentage of their total revenue than the state’s large IOUs.  
Michigan and Wisconsin have found success as well with every 
utility in each state investing in a consumer energy efficiency 
program.   
 These are all positive developments.  In Wisconsin and 
Michigan, where POUs are given minimum energy saving or program 
spending standards, every utility invests in an energy efficiency 
program.  In Iowa and Indiana, where POUs are excluded from the 
minimum standards (though encouraged to develop a program), 
nearly every utility invests in an energy efficiency program.  
The main thread running through these four states is that a state 
energy efficiency policy has been established.  Even where POUs 
are exempted from the regulation, they still seem to be investing 
in energy efficiency. 
 For policymakers looking to increase the adoption of energy 
efficiency in their communities one of the lessons in this thesis 
is that flexibility in policy design can be a good thing.  Iowa’s 
EERS is a good example.  Although the relatively strong energy 
saving standard does not apply to POUs the state does not exempt 
POUs from the EERS entirely.  They require POUs to establish 
energy efficiency programs, but allow each POU to set their own 
goals, however ambitious or modest they may be.  This has led to 
a wide variety of programs types and spending levels.  While 
there are a number of RECs and MUs in Iowa that have small 
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programs, there are many POUs in Iowa that voluntarily spend more 
on energy efficiency than any POUs in Michigan, even though the 
latter are not exempt from their state energy efficiency 
standards.  It’s the flexibility in Iowa’s policy that allows for 
some publicly-owned utilities to develop stronger energy 
efficiency programs than they might have if they were given 
strict minimum standards. 
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